Browse regulations

This regulation creates exceptions to deposit insurance requirements for retail associations, excluding certain large entities and government bodies from standard coverage. It defines 'prescribed deposits' based on entity type and financial thresholds, effectively limiting deposit insurance protection for deposits under $150,000 from governments, large financial institutions, corporations with >$5M revenue, pension funds with >$100M assets, and mutual funds managed by persons with >$10M assets.

This regulation imposes arbitrary thresholds that distort the banking market by creating a two-tiered deposit system. It increases regulatory complexity and compliance costs while protecting incumbent institutions from competition. The distinction between covered and non-covered depositors creates uncertainty and prevents market forces from determining optimal deposit arrangements. These artificial barriers serve no legitimate public interest that couldn't be achieved through simpler, more neutral regulation or eliminated entirely.

This regulation exempts certain large institutional deposits from insurance requirements under the Trust and Loan Companies Act, defining which entities can hold deposits over $150,000 without deposit insurance.

Creates regulatory burden and complexity for financial institutions while providing minimal consumer protection benefits. The exemption criteria favor large institutional players and create an uneven playing field, distorting market competition and reducing incentives for innovation in deposit products. The regulation's complexity increases compliance costs without clear evidence of corresponding benefits to Canadians.

The regulation mandates specific disclosures for Cooperative Credit Associations' retail associations that deposits are not CDIC-insured, requiring exact notice dimensions (27.94 cm × 43.18 cm), font sizes (120 pt heading, 50 pt text), verbal explanations with signed declarations, and prominent display in branches, websites, and ads.

The regulation imposes excessive compliance burdens through arbitrary specifications (exact dimensions, font sizes, signed declarations), creating barriers to entry, distorting incentives, and increasing costs that are passed to consumers. These command-and-control mandates ignore the knowledge problem—financial institutions are better positioned to design effective disclosures—ultimately reducing competition and financial inclusion without improving consumer understanding beyond what a simple 'clear and conspicuous' standard would achieve.

This regulation requires trust and loan companies to provide clear notices that their deposits are not insured by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, including specific formatting requirements for physical notices and website displays, and mandates verbal explanation of the insurance status to customers.

Consumers need protection from unknowingly depositing money in uninsured institutions. Without these requirements, people could be misled about deposit safety, potentially losing savings if a company fails. The regulation ensures informed consent and prevents deceptive practices in financial services.

Prescribes strict conditions for trust and loan companies issuing 'delivery shares' to subsidiaries for cross-border acquisitions, including fair market value, trading only on designated Canadian exchanges, arm's length dealing, and mandatory non-residency of involved parties.

Keeping this regulation imposes hidden costs: it shields designated Canadian exchanges from competition, restricts efficient cross-border capital flows, creates unnecessary compliance burdens, and freezes corporate reorganization into a single rigid structure. The rule's protectionist exchange requirements and residency mandates distort business decisions and raise costs without delivering commensurate public benefit that couldn't be achieved through market mechanisms and existing corporate law.

This regulation prescribes specific conditions for insurance companies and insurance holding companies to issue 'delivery shares' to a particular subsidiary for acquisition purposes under the Insurance Companies Act. It sets requirements including fair market value consideration, shares being traded on specific Canadian exchanges, arm's-length dealings, non-resident status of parties, and immediate transfer to shareholders. It mandates automatic cancellation of shares and return of consideration if conditions cease to be met within 30 days. The regulation primarily governs cross-border corporate restructuring involving insurance entities.

This regulation unnecessarily restricts corporate flexibility and imposes complex, prescriptive conditions on legitimate business transactions. It artificially mandates that shares must be traded only on specific Canadian exchanges and that parties must be non-residents, creating artificial barriers to efficient capital allocation. The automatic cancellation provision introduces significant commercial uncertainty. These constraints raise compliance costs, limit restructuring options, and reduce competitiveness without clear evidence of consumer benefit that cannot be achieved through less restrictive means. The regulation appears to address narrow historical concerns rather than serving a compelling public interest.

Regulation prescribes conditions for cooperative credit associations to issue 'delivery shares' to subsidiaries for cross-border acquisition/transfer transactions, requiring fair market value, exchange-listed shares, non-resident parties (per Income Tax Act), arm's length relationships, and immediate transfer to shareholders. Defines specific cancellation and reversal requirements if conditions aren't met.

This is hyper-technical, low-volume tax/regulatory arbitrage machinery. It doesn't protect consumers, ensure safety, or prevent fraud. Enables complex cross-border corporate shuffling that likely exists solely to optimize around tax and regulatory perimeter requirements. The costs include regulatory complexity, compliance burden for institutions, and facilitating profit shifting/structure-over-substance outcomes. No public benefit justifies maintaining such niche transaction rules; if desired outcomes are legitimate, they could be achieved through simpler, transparent means with fewer unintended distortions.

This regulation prescribes specific conditions for banks and bank holding companies to issue 'delivery shares' to subsidiaries for cross-border acquisitions, including requirements for fair market value, widely-traded shares on Canadian exchanges, arm's length dealing, and non-residency status, along with mandatory cancellation if conditions aren't met.

Adds unnecessary compliance burden and restricts efficient corporate structuring and cross-border capital flows with prescriptive conditions that duplicate existing tax and corporate law safeguards, chilling legitimate banking transactions without addressing a clear market failure that cannot be handled through general anti-abuse provisions or case-by-case oversight.

Provides a list of provincial Acts (Environment Act, Beverage Containers Acts, Environmental Protection Act) prescribed under Excise Tax Act paragraph 226(2)(b), clarifying tax treatment of associated programs.

Deletion would create uncertainty about which provincial environmental/beverage container programs are subject to the special tax rule, leading to disputes and inconsistent administration. The regulation's minimal burden is outweighed by the clarity it provides.

This appears to be a repealed regulation from 2013, with all sections marked as repealed under SOR/2013-211, paragraph 509(b). The regulation has no current active provisions or stated purpose since it was fully repealed over a decade ago.

The regulation is already repealed and obsolete. Keeping it on the books serves no purpose and creates unnecessary regulatory complexity. All provisions have been removed, making it a dead regulation that should be deleted to reduce regulatory burden.

Exempts specific government employees and law enforcement personnel from export/import permit requirements while performing official duties, including foreign state employees under agreements, Canadian police, corrections officers, coast guard, wildlife officers, and other designated public officers.

These exemptions are essential for public safety and security operations. Without them, foreign officials, law enforcement, corrections officers, and wildlife enforcement personnel would be unable to perform critical duties that require transporting controlled goods across borders. The exemptions ensure Canada can maintain international agreements, protect borders, enforce wildlife laws, and conduct corrections operations effectively.

Regulations governing fiscal equalization offset payments to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador from 2009-2020, including payment timing, per capita net debt calculations, and administrative procedures for federal transfers to provinces with offshore resource revenues.

Temporary federal transfer program that ended in 2020, creating moral hazard by shielding provinces from fiscal consequences of their policy choices and distorting provincial budget incentives, while adding regulatory complexity to federal-provincial fiscal relations.

2010 Order remitting customs duties and GST on temporarily imported goods/vehicles for Vancouver Olympics by athletes, officials, organizers, and authorized importers.

Obsolete (2010 event) and flawed: special-interest tax exemption violates equal treatment, creates regulatory clutter, and sets a harmful precedent for event-based carve-outs that invite rent-seeking and distort policy.

Exempts the RCMP from Radiocommunication Act provisions for a specific 4-day period (Oct 16-19, 2008) within a defined quadrilateral area in Quebec, permitting radio interference for security, safety, or international relations purposes, with a requirement to minimize such interference.

Obsolete: the exemption period has long expired. Keeping deadwood regulations creates legal clutter, imposes maintenance costs, and risks erroneous citation without providing any current benefit or serving a legitimate ongoing purpose.

PCB regulations controlling manufacture, import, export, use, storage, and disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls and products containing them, with concentration thresholds and specific exemptions for military, museum, and certain industrial equipment.

Creates regulatory burden that delays disposal of hazardous materials, imposes complex compliance costs on businesses, and restricts private alternatives in healthcare and housing while failing to address the fundamental supply problem that drives affordability issues.