Browse regulations

Tariff-rate quota limiting roses (HS 0603.10.11) entering under the Canada-Israel Agreement to 90,000 dozen per year, effective 1997.

Quantitative restrictions cap supply, raise consumer prices, distort market signals, create deadweight loss, and encourage rent-seeking; removing it would increase competition, lower costs, and improve allocative efficiency.

British Columbia rules governing applications to reduce years of imprisonment without parole eligibility, establishing procedures for filing, service, preliminary hearings, evidence presentation, and jury empanelment for Section 745.6 Criminal Code applications

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it provides a structured, fair process for prisoners to seek parole eligibility reduction. The rules ensure due process through preliminary hearings, evidence rules, and jury trials, preventing arbitrary denial of constitutional rights while maintaining public safety through rigorous procedural safeguards.

An Order that prohibits the issuance of property interests on the Rampart House Historic Site in Yukon (Lots 1 and 2, Group 1301), with exceptions for land within 60 feet of the US border and areas where fee simple title exists, effective December 4, 1997.

This ban violates private property rights and stifles economic activity by preventing any new interests or development. It creates a government monopoly over land use, reducing supply and potential wealth creation. Historic preservation can be achieved through voluntary private conservation, avoiding the unseen costs of underutilization and lost tax revenue.

This Order grants the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity legal corporate status and confers diplomatic privileges and immunities on its representatives, Executive Secretary, officials, and experts in Canada, implementing Canada's 1996 Headquarters Agreement.

This is a treaty implementation that facilitates international cooperation on biological diversity. The privileges and immunities are standard for intergovernmental organizations and are reciprocal—Canada expects similar treatment for its diplomats abroad. Deleting it would breach Canada's international commitments, damage diplomatic relations, and likely cause the Secretariat to relocate, depriving Canada of the environmental policy influence and expertise that hosting this UN agency provides. The regulation doesn't interfere with Canadian economic liberty or impose costs on citizens.

This order grants remission of anti-dumping duties on specific hot-dipped galvannealed steel sheet used in manufacturing non-exposed motor vehicle parts. It applies to imports on or after July 1, 1997, with claims required to be filed within two years of the order's coming into force on October 23, 1997, and requires evidence of use in vehicle parts production.

Keeping this regulation adds administrative burden, encourages rent-seeking, and perpetuates a discriminatory tariff system by carving out a narrow exemption rather than eliminating harmful anti-dumping duties entirely. It distorts market competition and is now obsolete, serving only as regulatory clutter.

Grants privileges and immunities to Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspectors, assistants, and observers performing missions in Canada, as required under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to fulfill Canada's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Deleting this would cripple Canada's ability to fulfill its CWC obligations, making Canada a potential safe haven for chemical weapons activities, undermining global security, and damaging Canada's international reputation. The immunities are narrowly tailored, essential for effective inspections, and standard practice for treaty implementation. The unintended consequences of repeal—evasion of oversight, diplomatic isolation, and security risks—far outweigh any marginal sovereignty concerns.

Establishes supply management for BC chicken, authorizing the marketing board to regulate interprovincial/export trade, impose producer levies, and equalize revenues among producers.

Keeping this regulation artificially restricts supply, raises prices, stifles competition, and imposes costly levies that punish efficient producers. The interprovincial trade barrier contradicts free trade principles, while the regulatory burden and quota system reduce economic freedom, innovation, and consumer welfare.

This regulation applies Prince Edward Island law (except the Highway Traffic Act) to the Confederation Bridge Area, a federal jurisdiction zone covering the bridge and adjacent lands/waters. It establishes legal clarity for this interprovincial infrastructure.

This regulation reduces transaction costs and legal uncertainty by providing clear jurisdictional rules for commerce, property rights, and contracts on a critical national transportation link. Deleting it would create ambiguity that could disrupt efficient operation of this interprovincial artery and increase litigation risks.

Employment equity program for aboriginal peoples in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, excluding certain Public Service Employment Act provisions for appointments under this program, effective July 16, 1997.

Creates special hiring exclusions that undermine merit-based public service principles and equal treatment under law, potentially reducing efficiency while fostering division rather than integration.

Regulation extends preferential tariffs to Chilean textile/apparel goods within annual quantitative limits, requiring importer declarations and exporter certifications to verify origin.

Quantitative caps impose artificial scarcity on mutually beneficial trade, creating deadweight loss. Administrative burdens increase compliance costs passed to consumers. Limits distort incentives toward rent-seeking rather than productive competition. Unseen costs include foregone gains from specialization, reduced Chilean market access, and potential trade diversion to less efficient suppliers.

Establishes procedures for verifying origin of goods claiming preferential tariff treatment under NAFTA and CCFTA, including questionnaires, verification visits (with notice and consent), record-keeping requirements, and grounds for denial of preferential treatment.

Imposes significant compliance costs, privacy intrusions, and regulatory overhead on businesses; enforces a managed trade system that distorts market incentives and deters cross-border commerce through bureaucratic barriers. Unseen effects include chilling effect on trade, potential for abuse, and added complexity that undermines competitiveness and liberty.

Regulation indexing excise tax adjustment ratios for September 1983 and September 1984.

Historical indexing ratios are obsolete; tax policy should use simple, transparent rules not arbitrary multipliers that create complexity and distort economic behavior.

Defines 'casual goods' as non-commercial imports and sets eligibility for Chile Tariff benefits on Chilean-acquired casual goods based on marking or lack of contrary evidence, implementing the Canada-Chile FTA.

Canadians would face higher costs and uncertainty for personal imports from Chile without this regulation, losing tariff preferences. Its simple marking/evidence rules efficiently verify origin at low administrative cost—a framework hard to replicate without clear guidelines.

Regulation establishes documentation requirements for goods to qualify for preferential tariff treatment under the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. It defines conditions for proving Chilean origin when goods are shipped directly or through third countries, requiring shipping documentation and customs control evidence to prevent tariff evasion.

Deleting this regulation would revoke preferential tariff benefits for Chilean goods, raising costs for Canadian consumers and businesses while violating treaty obligations. The minimal administrative burden is necessary to maintain trade benefits and prevent fraud, making Canadians worse off without it.

This Order grants remission of customs duties on bulk distilled spirits imported under US/Mexico/Chile tariffs for bottling in bond by licensed distillers, with conditions including a 2-year claim period and information requirements. It came into force July 5, 1997 to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

This duty remission creates a selective exemption that distorts market competition by favoring licensed distillers who can meet the bottling-in-bond requirements. It adds administrative complexity, creates compliance costs, and undermines tax neutrality. The underlying duty itself should be reconsidered; this carve-out entrenches special privileges rather than achieving a free market. Unintended effects include incentivizing artificial import/bottling structures to capture remissions rather than optimizing for consumer welfare, and complicating customs administration for minimal public benefit.