Browse regulations

The Securities Dealing Restrictions (Banks) Regulations prohibit Canadian banks from engaging in various securities activities including primary distributions of shares/corporate debt, secondary trading, and acting as selling agents for mutual funds, with narrow exceptions for government securities, money market instruments, and proprietary trading.

These restrictions reduce competition, increase costs, and limit financial innovation by artificially separating commercial and investment banking. The intended safety benefits are better achieved through capital requirements and disclosure rules, while the unseen costs include lost efficiency, reduced consumer choice, and weakened competitiveness of Canada's financial sector.

Restricts cooperative credit associations from dealing in certain securities, including primary distributions and secondary market trading, with specific exceptions for government debt, money market securities, and certain institutional activities.

Creates artificial barriers to financial services, restricts voluntary exchange, reduces market efficiency, and harms Canada's financial competitiveness without providing commensurate consumer protection benefits.

Regulations defining borrowing limits for life insurance companies, specifying which subsidiaries count toward debt limits, defining total assets calculation, and setting a 20% debt-to-assets cap for life companies.

Creates artificial borrowing constraints that limit financial flexibility, potentially reducing capital availability for insurance products and increasing costs for consumers. The 20% cap is arbitrary and may prevent efficient capital allocation without clear evidence of systemic risk reduction.

These Regulations prohibit trust and loan companies from dealing in securities in Canada, restricting primary distributions, secondary trading, and mutual fund selling activities, with numerous exceptions for government debt, money market instruments, proprietary trading, private placements, and specific syndicated transactions.

This regulation arbitrarily restricts the business activities of trust and loan companies, reducing competition and consumer choice in financial services. Its complex web of exceptions reveals its incoherence—permitting some securities activities while forbidding others with no principled economic rationale. Modern regulation should focus on universal conduct rules (fraud, disclosure) rather than institution-based barriers that protect incumbents and prevent Canadians from accessing integrated financial services. Such restrictions distort markets, increase costs, and artificially segment the financial sector.

Regulation prohibits defoamers containing dibenzofuran (>40 ppb) or dibenzo-para-dioxin (>10 ppb) in mills using chlorine bleaching, bans wood chips treated with polychlorinated phenols, and requires quarterly reporting and record-keeping to monitor compliance.

Dioxins and furans are among the most toxic persistent organic pollutants known, causing cancer and ecological damage even at parts-per-billion levels. Without this regulation, mills could freely use contaminated defoamers, imposing severe health and environmental costs on Canadians far beyond any compliance burden. The regulation internalizes a catastrophic externality that tort law cannot practically address at scale.

The Pulp and Paper Mill Effluent Chlorinated Dioxins and Furans Regulations prohibit release of measurable concentrations of 2,3,7,8-TCDD and 2,3,7,8-TCDF from pulp mills with chlorine bleaching plants. They mandate regular sampling using a Reference Method, reporting to the Minister, and establish phased compliance with graduated monitoring frequency based on demonstrated performance.

Canadians would be worse off without this regulation because dioxins and furans are among the most toxic persistent pollutants, causing cancer, reproductive harm, and ecosystem damage. The regulation internalizes a severe externality that tort law cannot practically address against diffuse public harm. Its strict, specific limits compel adoption of cleaner production technologies (e.g., chlorine dioxide substitution, total chlorine avoidance) that protect downstream property rights and public health at a fraction of the social cost of unregulated pollution.

Authorizes cooperative credit associations to charge a maximum fee of $5 for issuing a security certificate related to a transfer.

The arbitrary $5 price cap restricts voluntary contracting, distorts market pricing, and may cause under-provision if actual costs exceed the cap. It assumes associations cannot set reasonable fees themselves, undermining liberty and creating unseen costs like reduced service availability or cross-subsidization.

Restricts use of cooperative credit association names in securities-related documents, permitting use only when required by law or with the association's written permission.

Keeping this regulation imposes compliance costs, creates bureaucratic friction, and restricts commercial speech. Its protective aims are already achieved through existing defamation, trademark, and securities laws, making it a redundant barrier to market efficiency.

This regulation governs when a person may use the name of a trust or loan company in securities-related documents (prospectuses, offering memoranda, takeover bid circulars, advertisements). It permits use only when required by law or with the company's express written permission.

The regulation adds a redundant layer of specificity requiring written permission for company name usage in securities documents. Companies already have robust incentives and legal mechanisms (trademark law, contract law, common law torts) to protect their brand identity. The minor compliance burden of requiring 'express written' rather than oral or implied permission contributes to cumulative regulatory friction without providing meaningful additional protection. Existing legal frameworks suffice, making this rule unnecessary.

This regulation caps the fee that trust and loan companies may charge for issuing a security certificate related to a securities transfer at a maximum of $5.

This price control distorts market incentives in a competitive industry. The $5 cap may be below the true marginal cost of providing the service, reducing supply as companies choose not to offer it or cross-subsidize from other revenue streams. It prevents price discrimination that could serve different customer needs (e.g., expedited service) and stifles innovation in service delivery. Consumers would be better served by market competition and transparent pricing rather than an arbitrary government-mandated fee schedule.

This Order provides a remission of customs duties on the drilling rig Rowan Gorilla III imported by LASMO Nova Scotia Limited for the Cohasset/Panuke Oil Development Project, calculated based on the rig's value and duration in Canadian waters, with claims to be made within two years.

The targeted duty exemption distorts market competition, granting unfair advantage to a single firm and encouraging rent-seeking. It violates the principle of equal treatment under the law and creates hidden costs by distorting investment decisions and delaying broader tariff reform. Such cronyist interventions undermine economic efficiency and liberty.

The Kindersley Airport Zoning Regulations establish height and land-use restrictions around Kindersley Airport to protect airspace for aircraft operations. They prohibit construction that intrudes on imaginary surfaces (approach, outer, transitional), require removal of excessive natural growth, and ban waste disposal that attracts birds.

Deletion would compromise aviation safety by allowing obstructions in critical flight paths, increasing crash risk and potentially forcing airport closure, harming transportation, commerce, and emergency services.

The Weyburn Airport Zoning Regulations establish imaginary obstacle limitation surfaces (approach, outer, transitional) around the airport to prevent tall structures from endangering aircraft. They prohibit construction above these surfaces, empower the Minister to require removal of excessive natural growth, and ban waste disposal that could attract birds.

Deleting this would permit obstructions that could cause aircraft crashes, risking lives and property. The precise technical standards provide a clear, enforceable safety margin that is difficult to replicate through private agreements given the numerous affected landowners and catastrophic potential of coordination failures.

This regulation exempts short-term positions (less than 3 months total, under 6 months annually) in specific DND categories from standard public service hiring rules, allowing direct appointment by the Deputy Head with one-day termination notice for cause or lack of work.

Deleting this would force DND to use cumbersome civil service processes for temporary staff, increasing bureaucracy and costs while reducing operational flexibility. The regulation efficiently addresses short-term staffing needs that would be difficult to meet through alternative means without similar exemptions, ultimately costing taxpayers more and hampering departmental responsiveness.

This 1992 order temporarily excluded certain short-term employees (less than 3 months per appointment, totaling under 6 months annually) from Public Service Employment Act requirements when hired by Department of National Defence in specific occupational categories. The exclusion was valid only from April 9, 1992 to April 30, 1994.

The regulation is repealed/expired (ended April 30, 1994) and has no current legal effect. Even when active, it created a temporary two-tier workforce by exempting DND from standard public service hiring rules, undermining merit-based civil service principles and fair competition for government jobs.