Browse regulations

Baker Lake Airport Zoning Regulations prohibit construction that intrudes into protected airspace surfaces (approach, outer, transitional) around the airport to ensure aviation safety.

Canadians would be worse off because unregulated development near airports endangers lives through collision risks. This regulation achieves safety efficiently by establishing clear, enforceable boundaries ex ante; alternatives like private contracts or tort law would be fragmented, incomplete, and reactive, failing to prevent accidents before they occur. The minimal property rights burden is justified by the substantial public safety benefit.

Aviation safety zoning regulation for Arviat Airport (NT). Prohibits construction above imaginary approach, outer, and transitional surfaces within a 4,000m radius. Establishes precise height restrictions tied to runway endpoints and airport reference point elevation (9.0m).

Prevents catastrophic externalities: one landowner's tall structure could cause fatal aircraft crashes, endangering hundreds and disrupting essential air service to remote communities. Liability/voluntary approaches fail to prevent reckless development or provide flight safety certainty. Technical precision and enforceability are irreplaceable for aviation safety.

Regulation modifies various Newfoundland Acts to apply them to the Hibernia offshore oil project area, making technical amendments to definitions (expanding 'corporation' to include partnerships), filing requirements, and judicial discretion for rectifying clerical errors in registration documents. Primarily harmonizes provincial security and commercial law for this specific offshore project.

These are hyper-specific amendments for a single project that create legal complexity without justification. The regulation embeds Newfoundland's corporate and property laws into federal offshore jurisdiction, entrenching provincial red tape that will increase compliance costs for all future offshore developments. The amendments expand definitions and maintain bureaucratic filing requirements rather than eliminating them—judicial discretion for clerical errors acknowledges the system's brittleness but doesn't fix the underlying regulatory burden. This regulatory patchwork creates uncertainty and legal overhead that harms investment in Canada's offshore energy sector.

Establishes a fee of $0.30 per page for copies of registered charities' information returns filed under the Income Tax Act, with the first 20 copies per person per fiscal year free, and includes anti-abuse provisions treating requests made for others as made by the requester to prevent circumvention of the free allowance.

Canadians would be worse off if deleted because it would either force all taxpayers to subsidize unlimited free copies for frequent requesters or create uncertainty about legitimate cost recovery; the regulation fairly balances public access with fiscal responsibility, ensuring transparency while preventing both taxpayer burden and arbitrary pricing.

These Regulations establish airport protection zones around Swan River Airport defining imaginary surfaces (approach, outer, transitional) to prevent obstructions that could endanger aircraft operations. They prohibit construction exceeding these surfaces and ban waste disposal that attracts birds.

Canadians would face heightened risk of aircraft accidents if this regulation were deleted. The zoning provides a clear, predictable, and enforceable rule that prevents obstructions despite numerous landowners—a solution vastly more efficient than private negotiation given prohibitive transaction costs and the severe consequences of a single unsafe structure.

Exempts the Kemano Completion Project from the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, based on a 1987 settlement agreement between Canada, British Columbia, and Alcan Aluminum Limited.

This creates a special exemption for a specific corporation, undermining equal application of law and the rule of law. It represents regulatory favoritism that distorts market competition by giving Alcan a privilege not available to others. Even if the project was reviewed in 1987, the exemption from ongoing environmental oversight creates a dangerous precedent where connected firms can evade rules that bind all others.

This order authorizes the Canada Development Investment Corporation, a federal Crown corporation, to relocate its registered office from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Toronto, Ontario by applying for articles of amendment. It is a simple administrative authorization for a government entity to change its legal headquarters location.

While the regulation itself is benign and doesn't impose burdens on private actors, it serves as an enabling mechanism for a Crown corporation to make an operational change. Deleting it would create unnecessary legal uncertainty without any benefit. The regulation achieves its narrow purpose efficiently without unintended consequences or market distortions, making repeal a pointless exercise in regulatory reductionism that would not improve liberty or prosperity.

Grants the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) legal capacity as a body corporate and privileges/immunities in Canada under the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, enabling the organization to operate effectively in Canadian jurisdiction for peace monitoring in the Sinai.

Deletion would breach Canada's international obligations, damage diplomatic credibility, and undermine participation in multinational peacekeeping efforts that contribute to global stability. The regulation merely recognizes an existing treaty commitment without imposing domestic costs or restrictions on Canadians.

This regulation prescribes specific adjustment multipliers (0.8804 for motor gasoline, 0.9681 for diesel oil) to be applied to the Industrial Product Price Index for the twelve months preceding October 1985, for purposes of paragraph 50.1(2)(a) of the Excise Tax Act.

Obsolescence. This regulation applies only to a specific historical period (12 months before October 1985) and has no current relevance. Keeping obsolete regulations creates unnecessary complexity, imposes maintenance burdens, and generates legal uncertainty. The intended adjustment was time-bound and its purpose has long been fulfilled.

Allows pre-1985 full-time healthcare workers for the Canadian Forces to count that service toward their public service pension by election, with a one-year window for deemed elections after leaving public service.

Obsolete (election window long expired) and originally created an unjustified special privilege, violating equal treatment and increasing pension liabilities without public benefit; keeping it perpetuates flawed precedent and unequal protection under the law.

This is a 1980s-era technical regulation that sets specific numerical multipliers for adjusting excise tax rates. It provides the exact ratios (1.35559, 1.99924, 1.37078, 1.88464) to be applied on September 1, 1983 and September 1, 1984 respectively for two different tax adjustment mechanisms under the Excise Tax Act.

This regulation is obsolete (over 40 years old) and serves no current legal purpose. It contains only historical calculation parameters for tax adjustments that have long since been applied. Keeping obsolete statutes creates legal clutter, wastes administrative resources, and risks confusion. The technical formulas could be removed entirely without affecting any current tax system or policy objective, as their function was time-bound and already executed.

This 1990 Order authorizes Petro-Canada Limited and its wholly-owned subsidiaries to undertake specific corporate transactions (incorporations, acquisitions, sales, dissolutions) with values not exceeding 0.5% of Petro-Canada's 1989 consolidated gross assets, solely during the year 1990.

Obsolete, time-limited order for a state-owned enterprise privatized in 1991. Keeping it creates regulatory clutter, undermines legal clarity, and represents special treatment for a former crown corporation that should not exist on modern statute books.

This 1990 Order sets maximum benefit amounts ($130M, $120M, $376M) for three sections of the Unemployment Insurance Act for that specific year only.

This regulation is obsolete—it sets one-year benefit caps for 1990 and has no legal effect today. Keeping it creates regulatory clutter and potential confusion; annual benefit levels are determined through current legislation and orders.

This order establishes a mandatory centralized marketing board (Commodity Board) that monopolizes all interprovincial and export milk trade in Manitoba. It prohibits direct sales/purchases between producers and buyers, requires all milk to flow through the board, and redistributes pooled revenues to producers based on production metrics. Transportation is also controlled by the board.

This regulation imposes substantial hidden costs: higher consumer prices through enforced monopoly; deadweight loss from bureaucratic allocation; suppressed competition and innovation; barriers to market entry; distorted producer incentives away from consumer demand; and rent-seeking opportunities. The pooling mechanism transfers wealth from consumers to producers while eliminating price discovery. These unseen costs violate the liberal principle of voluntary exchange and artificially restrict supply, making Canadians worse off through higher prices and fewer choices.

Zoning regulation establishing the town of Banff within Banff National Park, Alberta, defining its boundaries and land area (487 hectares).

Creates artificial scarcity by locking prime land within a national park under restrictive zoning, preventing housing development and driving up costs for residents while limiting economic growth and property rights in one of Canada's most desirable locations.