Browse regulations

This Order approves temporary exclusions (1989-1993) from the Public Service Employment Act for positions filled under employment equity programs for target groups (women, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, disabled persons). It exempts these appointments from competitive processes, certain selection standards, and removes appeal rights for others who would have been considered.

This regulation violates the principle of equal treatment under the law by creating separate, less competitive pathways based on group identity rather than individual merit. It reduces public service quality by exempting positions from normal competitive selection and removes due process (appeal rights) for non-beneficiaries. The unintended consequence entrenches group-based classification and treats individuals as quota representatives, contrary to classical liberal principles of individual dignity and color-blind meritocracy. The temporary nature suggests even proponents recognized it was not sustainable.

Procedural rules governing applications under Criminal Code subsection 745(1) for reduction of parole ineligibility periods for dangerous offenders in Newfoundland. Establishes filing requirements, service protocols, jury empanelment procedures, evidence presentation rules, and hearing conduct for these specialized applications.

These rules ensure due process and consistent administration for serious criminal justice matters involving dangerous offenders. Deleting them would create procedural arbitrariness in a context where both public safety and offender rights are at stake. The structured process prevents chaos in hearings that involve jury determinations on parole eligibility extensions—a function courts cannot abandon. While minimalist administration is valued, these narrow procedural rules serve a necessary role in a legitimate state function, providing clear pathways that protect against ad hoc decision-making that could either endanger the public or unjustly detain individuals.

Defines 'small retransmission system' as a cable/terrestrial retransmission system serving ≤2,000 premises in a service area, with aggregation rules for commonly owned systems within 5km and exclusions for certain master antenna systems.

Creates arbitrary thresholds (2,000 premises, 5km) that impose compliance costs, distort business decisions and market consolidation, and entrench a two-tiered regulatory classification without economic justification. The grandfather clause for pre-1994 systems creates unfair competition.

Moosonee Airport Zoning Regulations establish protected airspace surfaces (approach, outer, transitional) around Moosonee Airport in Ontario. They prohibit construction of buildings/structures that exceed defined elevation surfaces, require removal of excessive natural growth, and ban waste disposal that attracts birds—all to maintain safe airport operations.

The regulation prevents catastrophic harm to human life by protecting aircraft approach/departure paths from obstructions and reducing bird-strike hazards. Aviation safety creates unique externalities where failure causes mass casualties; tort law alone is insufficient for prevention. The rules are narrowly tailored with precise technical standards, affecting limited geographic areas. While they restrict property use, this is justified under the harm principle to prevent foreseeable dangers to passengers, crew, and ground occupants. Private arrangements would be prohibitively complex to coordinate across many landowners for such high-stakes infrastructure.

1989 Order establishes detailed fee schedules for airborne remote sensing services provided by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, specifying per-unit charges for outputs like HDDT mounts, CCTs, image processing, and film products.

Obsolete price controls distort market signals, crowd out private competition, and lock in 1989-era technical specifications that cannot adapt to technological change. Government should exit this market, allowing private providers to offer services with dynamic pricing and innovation.

This regulation extends the right to access government information under the Access to Information Act to non-Canadian citizens and non-permanent residents present in Canada, as well as to corporations present in Canada.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it promotes transparency and accountability in government operations. Without it, foreign individuals and corporations conducting business or residing in Canada would be denied access to information that affects their rights, interests, and participation in Canadian society. This would create a two-tier system of information access, reduce trust in Canadian institutions, and potentially discourage international investment and cooperation.

Extends the right to access personal information under the Privacy Act to all individuals present in Canada, including non-citizens and temporary residents.

Deleting it would create a two-tier system where only citizens can access their personal data, undermining fairness and Canada's global reputation, potentially reducing skilled immigration and foreign investment. The regulation achieves broad access cost-effectively through existing Privacy Act mechanisms.

This regulation establishes a supply management system for Manitoba vegetable producers, requiring all vegetable sales to go through the Manitoba Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board. It mandates centralized marketing, pooling of proceeds, and controlled distribution to producers based on quantity and quality. The regulation also requires marketing tags for containers, delivery orders for transport, and exempts one specific company from certain requirements.

This regulation creates a government-mandated cartel that restricts free trade, eliminates price signals, and reduces market efficiency. It forces producers to sell only through a single board, eliminates competition, and creates artificial scarcity. The centralized pooling system removes individual incentives for quality and innovation, while the mandatory marketing tags and delivery orders add bureaucratic overhead. Such supply management systems have been shown to increase consumer prices, reduce agricultural productivity, and protect incumbent producers at the expense of new entrants and consumers.

Regulates temporary storage periods for transshipped goods, establishing a 6-month threshold to determine if goods are considered shipped directly to Canada or not for customs purposes.

Creates arbitrary time-based barrier to trade that increases costs for Canadian importers and consumers without clear benefit. The 6-month threshold is an artificial constraint that can force rushed shipping decisions and higher logistics costs, ultimately making goods more expensive for Canadians while providing no meaningful protection to domestic industries.

Authorization for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Crown corporation) to incorporate subsidiaries and acquire shares, enabling its corporate structure and ownership activities.

Costs of keeping: entrenches Crown corporation model that distorts markets, creates regulatory privilege unavailable to private competitors, and perpetuates government ownership of enterprises better allocated to private investors. Redundant with standard corporate law applicable to all businesses.

Diving safety regulations for offshore oil and gas operations, covering personnel certification, equipment standards, procedures, and emergency protocols for various diving categories (I, II, III, ADS).

Creates excessive bureaucratic overhead that stifles innovation in diving technology and methods, while imposing rigid certification requirements that prevent qualified professionals from working and increase costs without proportional safety benefits.

Alberta Rules of Practice for reduction in imprisonment years without parole eligibility, establishing procedural framework for applications under Criminal Code subsection 672(1), including filing requirements, service procedures, jury empanelment, evidence presentation, and judicial oversight of parole eligibility reduction requests.

This regulation provides essential procedural safeguards for a critical criminal justice mechanism that allows certain offenders to apply for reduced parole ineligibility periods. Without these rules, the process would lack standardization, potentially leading to inconsistent outcomes, inadequate due process protections, and uncertainty for both applicants and victims. The structured framework ensures fair hearings while maintaining public safety considerations.

Authorizes Canadian National Railway Company to sell all shares of Terra Nova Telecommunications Inc. to Newfoundland Telephone Company Limited by September 1, 1989.

Obsolete one-time authorization for a specific corporate transaction that should be free from government interference; retaining it adds unnecessary regulatory clutter with no current purpose.

Authorizes Canadian National Railway Company to sell all Northwestel Inc. shares to BCE Inc. by September 1, 1989

This is a one-time transaction authorization that creates unnecessary regulatory overhead for private share sales. The market can handle corporate acquisitions without government intervention, and this regulation imposes costs without providing public benefit.

This Order grants diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Commonwealth of Learning (an intergovernmental agency) and its personnel when operating in Canada, extending UN Convention protections to representatives, senior officials, officials, and experts, shielding them from legal process, taxation based on residence, and granting immunity for official acts.

This creates a two-tier legal system where international organization personnel are above Canadian law. The immunity from civil and criminal process violates the rule of law and equal treatment—principles foundational to a free society. These privileges distort incentives, reduce accountability, and harm Canadians by withholding the full protection of their legal system from claims against privileged actors. The organization could operate without such extraordinary exemptions; the Canada Revenue Agency could issue tax rulings; liability concerns could be addressed through standard waivers or indemnities. The unseen costs are incalculable: a privileged class operating outside Canadian justice erodes social contract and creates resentment. This is statist cronyism at its worst—special legal status for an international NGO with no compelling justification.