Browse regulations

This Order grants the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie and its Institute legal corporate status in Canada, along with privileges and immunities under the UN Convention, for representatives, officials, and experts. It exempts them from certain legal processes, taxation (based on residency), and grants diplomatic-level immunities to senior officials.

This regulation creates an unnecessary separate legal class, undermining Canadian sovereignty and equal application of law for a cultural organization. The Francophonie's diplomatic engagement can occur through normal channels without immunities; the organization has no compelling mandate that requires exemption from Canadian jurisdiction. The unseen cost is the precedent of granting legal exemptions to non-essential international bodies, which could expand to erode accountability.

Remission order for customs duties on satellites and satellite subsystems for testing and manufacturing, effective January 1, 1988, with a 3-year claim window for reimbursement.

Customs duties on space technology create artificial scarcity, increase costs for Canadian space industry, and discourage innovation. These duties serve no legitimate protectionist purpose since space technology has no domestic industry to protect - they merely raise barriers for Canadian companies competing globally.

This Manitoba order prohibits producers from marketing turkeys in interprovincial or export trade without authorization from the Manitoba Turkey Producers' Marketing Board. It requires clearance certificates for all turkey transportation and mandates that transporters carry certificates during transit and report transport details to the Board afterwards.

This regulation enforces a classic interprovincial trade barrier by requiring government permission for turkey sales across provincial or international borders. The costs include: 1) artificially restricting supply and raising prices for Canadian consumers; 2) preventing Manitoba producers from freely accessing markets; 3) bureaucratic overhead from the Board, inspectors, and certificate system; 4) violation of property rights; and 5) contributing to Canada's fragmented internal market. No legitimate public purpose—such as food safety—requires this restriction, as such goals can be achieved through non-discriminatory regulations. These marketing boards persist only to shield producers from competition at the expense of consumers and economic liberty.

Exempts all property, rights, interests, and obligations of the Crown held by Eldorado Nuclear Limited as of September 30, 1988 from subsection 4(4) of the Eldorado Nuclear Limited Reorganization and Divestiture Act, excluding shares of the successor amalgamated corporation.

This 1988 corporation-specific exemption violates rule of law by granting special legal treatment. It creates regulatory uncertainty, distorts market competition, and entrenchs cronyism. Such carve-outs impose deadweight costs through legal complexity and signal that political connections override general laws—antithetical to free market principles. If still necessary after 38 years, the reorganization was fundamentally flawed. All entities should operate under uniform laws without politically-motivated exemptions.

Remission order granting customs duty relief on rotogravure printing rolls imported by DOMCO Industries Limited, with specific conditions including import date, usage in resilient floor covering manufacturing, minimum width, and three-year claim window.

Creates arbitrary, company-specific tax breaks that distort market competition, pick winners, and undermine equal treatment under the law while adding regulatory complexity.

Airport zoning regulation establishing imaginary safety surfaces around Brandon Airport, restricting building heights and waste disposal to prevent aviation hazards.

Preemptively restricts private property rights and development potential, creating deadweight losses in land value and housing supply. Aviation safety could be achieved through liability rules and market negotiations without the unseen costs of zoning, including constrained economic activity and permanent distortion of property rights.

Federal loan insurance program for Northern Ontario businesses in designated sectors, covering up to 85% of loans ($100k-$15M) with 20% equity requirement; applications closed March 31, 1992.

Subsidy distorts market allocation, creates moral hazard, and imposes contingent taxpayer liability. It privileges specific regions and sectors, undermining price signals and perpetuating inefficient regional dependency. The 1992 deadline confirms obsolescence.

Authorizes Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to sell shares of Nordion International Inc. and Theratronics International Limited to Canada Development Investment Corporation, and authorizes the latter to acquire these shares.

Government shareholding in private companies creates market distortions, reduces competition, and prevents efficient capital allocation. These transactions likely originated from political rather than economic considerations, with no clear public benefit that couldn't be achieved through other means.

This 1988 Order authorizes Theratronics International Limited to incorporate a corporation and acquire its shares, with the shares to be held by or in trust for Theratronics. It grants specific permission to a single company for routine corporate structuring activities.

This regulation represents unnecessary government interference in private corporate structuring. In a free market, incorporation and share acquisition should be generally available without special authorization. Granting permission to one specific company creates unjustifiable special treatment and establishes a harmful precedent for regulatory discretion. The order imposes bureaucratic complexity with zero public benefit, violates equal treatment under corporate law, and should have been unnecessary from the start. Such permissions belong in general corporate statutes, not individualized Orders-in-Council.

Authorizes Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to create, acquire, and hold shares in Theratronics International Limited and to transfer its Medical Products Division to that corporation.

This regulation enables government-owned enterprise to create a subsidiary and transfer assets, creating unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and potential conflicts of interest. Private companies can accomplish these corporate restructurings without regulatory authorization, and government involvement in such commercial decisions distorts market signals and perpetuates inefficient state-owned enterprises.

Regulation governing a special pension scheme for diplomatic service officials, including election procedures, benefit calculations using outdated 1941 life tables at 4% interest, and documentation requirements.

Creates a privileged pension system for diplomatic officials outside standard frameworks, distorting labor market incentives and imposing unjustified costs on taxpayers. Special pension benefits for any class of government employees constitute inappropriate government overreach that elevates compensation above market norms.

This 1988 Order establishes a fixed tariff of fees for Port Warden services at Montreal port, including vessel inspections, cargo inspections, loading certificates, and related services. Fees are prescribed by government order rather than market competition, with specific amounts for each service type.

This regulation fixes prices for port inspection services, eliminating competitive market forces that would determine fair pricing. Government-set fees distort incentives, create barriers to entry for private competition, and likely inflate costs for vessel owners and ultimately consumers. The services could be provided more efficiently by private entities competing on price and quality. The regulation achieves nothing that voluntary contracts and liability law couldn't handle better, while imposing hidden costs through reduced supply options and monopoly pricing.

This Order authorizes the Canada Development Investment Corporation to acquire 51% of a corporation that will own Ginn and Company (Canada) and GLC Publishers Limited from Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. It is a narrow, transaction-specific authorization from an era of government industrial policy.

Keeping this obsolete order imposes costs through regulatory clutter and dangerous precedent. It authorizes a Crown corporation to acquire private publishing companies without a legitimate public purpose, distorting markets and crowding out private capital. The mere existence of such transaction-specific intervention grants legitimacy to government takeovers of private enterprise—contrary to liberty and property rights—and represents the kind of industrial policy that misallocates resources, stifles competition, and ultimately reduces prosperity.

A Manitoba marketing board order that prohibits chicken producers from selling in interprovincial or export markets without explicit exemption, creating supply management and trade restrictions.

This regulation artificially restricts interprovincial trade, raising prices and limiting consumer choice. It creates government-granted privileges that distort market signals, reduce supply, and violate free trade principles. The costs include higher food prices, reduced efficiency, and barriers to entry for producers.

Establishes a $10 fee for replacing Social Insurance Number cards, with exceptions for legal name changes, government errors, and natural disasters.

The fee imposes an unnecessary financial burden on Canadians, creates a barrier to employment and services for low-income individuals, and the administrative costs of collection likely exceed the revenue. Eliminating it would increase access to essential identification without meaningful fiscal impact.