Browse regulations

Establishes registration fees of $250 for Field Sampling Program and $250 per laboratory for Analytical Program under the Urea Formaldehyde Insulation Act

Fee creates unnecessary barrier to participation in safety programs without evidence of offsetting benefits; reduces supply of testing services and increases costs for consumers seeking urea formaldehyde insulation safety verification

Zoning regulations for Campbell River Airport that restrict building heights, vegetation growth, and land use around the airport to ensure aviation safety and prevent bird strikes. The regulations create protected airspace zones including approach surfaces, outer surfaces, and transitional surfaces, and prohibit structures exceeding specified heights or land use that could attract birds.

Aviation safety requires these protections - without height restrictions, buildings and structures could interfere with aircraft approaches and departures. The bird strike prevention measures are critical for preventing potentially catastrophic accidents. These regulations balance property rights with the essential public safety function of maintaining safe airspace for air travel.

Mandatory $1.45 plus HST per hog levy on New Brunswick producers when marketing outside the province, collected by Porc NB Pork.

Artificially raises costs for interprovincial/export trade, distorting incentives and reducing competitiveness; it exemplifies harmful interprovincial trade barriers that suppress prosperity.

This order grants tax remission to individuals with Quebec ties by redefining 'income earned in Quebec' and providing refunds to non-residents and Quebec residents, including special categories like students, teachers, and Quebec government employees. It also waives related penalties/interest and sets special withholding rules.

It adds tax complexity, creates unequal treatment across provinces, distorts labor mobility decisions, and imposes administrative costs. The targeted benefit encourages rent-seeking and could be better achieved through broad-based tax simplification, eliminating the need for such patchwork measures.

Waives Crown reservation rights for a specific 0.36-hectare parcel of unsurveyed land in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, allowing transfer of ownership rights.

This is a narrow administrative waiver facilitating a specific land transfer. Deleting it would block the transaction without reducing any ongoing regulatory burden; it achieves its limited purpose efficiently and has no broader market distortions.

Prescribes terms and conditions for advances from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to the Unemployment Insurance Account, including promissory note requirements, interest rates set by the Minister of Finance, repayment schedules, and prepayment rules.

Deleting this regulation would create legal uncertainty about the terms of advances, risking delays in funding unemployment benefits during economic downturns. The regulation provides a clear, standardized framework that ensures accountability and timely support for unemployed Canadians, which would be difficult to replicate without rule-based mechanisms. Removing it could also weaken fiscal controls over inter-departmental lending, potentially leading to misallocation of public funds.

Regulation sets a fixed conversion rate from gold francs to IMF Special Drawing Rights (15.075 gold francs per SDR), and mandates converting SDRs to Canadian dollars at the IMF-established rate. Purpose is to determine Canadian dollar equivalents of gold francs referenced in the Carriage by Air Act for liability limits in international air carriage.

Gold francs are an obsolete unit of account from early 20th century international transport conventions. This regulation maintains a technical conversion mechanism for a currency unit no longer in active use, adding complexity without serving any contemporary purpose. Modern conventions have moved to SDRs or other units directly, making this intermediate conversion rule unnecessary. Retaining obsolete technical rules cluttered the regulatory landscape and creates uncertainty about whether they still apply. The same outcome (currency conversion) could be handled by courts using current exchange rates if ever needed, without a dedicated regulation.

Establishes a Quebec-based Commodity Board with authority to regulate interprovincial and export trade of wood, including setting levies, classifying producers, and managing marketing operations.

Creates a provincial marketing board that restricts interprovincial trade, imposes mandatory levies, and centralizes pricing decisions - effectively establishing a cartel that reduces market competition, raises consumer costs, and prevents efficient allocation of resources across provincial borders.

A 1980s-era regulation setting specific numeric multipliers (1.35559, 1.99924, 1.37078, 1.88464) for adjusting excise tax ratios on September 1, 1983 and September 1, 1984. It provides one-time adjustment factors to the Excise Tax Act but contains no ongoing mechanism.

The regulation is functionally obsolete with both adjustment dates having passed over 40 years ago. It serves no current purpose, creates regulatory clutter, and imposes unnecessary maintenance burden. No legitimate indexing function would be achieved by retaining 1983-1984 specific multipliers. Any needed inflation indexing should be handled by modern, automatic mechanisms. No Canadians are worse off without these expired technical adjustments.

Historical regulation setting specific excise duty indexing multipliers for September 1, 1983 and September 1, 1984 adjustments under the Excise Act

Obsolete regulation with past-dated provisions that have no current effect; keeping it creates legal clutter and compliance burden without serving any purpose. Automatic indexing or current-year regulations would be more appropriate.

Federal subsidies program for industrial and regional development, offering repayable/non-repayable contributions (17.5%-50% of costs) for R&D, facility establishment, expansion, and marketing, with tiers based on regional development indices.

Subsidies distort capital allocation, create dependency and rent-seeking, impose administrative costs, and use taxpayer funds to sustain activities markets would reject, reducing overall productivity and wealth creation.

This regulation authorizes the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce to provide loan insurance (up to $5 million) to private lenders who lend to Pêcheurs Unis du Québec, a Quebec fishing co-operative, provided the loan promotes the co-operative's growth, efficiency, international competitiveness, and Canadian trade expansion.

This targeted loan guarantee creates moral hazard, distorting credit markets by encouraging private lenders to take excessive risks with taxpayer-backed insurance. It picks winners and losers, granting unfair competitive advantage to one co-operative at public expense. Hidden costs include capital misallocation, suppressed market discipline, and exposure of taxpayers to potential defaults—all undermining the price signals and voluntary exchange that drive sustainable prosperity.

These regulations establish a government loan insurance program for a specific Nova Scotia fishermen's co-operative, covering up to 90% of loans (max $360,000) to promote its growth, efficiency, international competitiveness, and Canadian trade expansion.

Government-guaranteed loans distort credit markets, create moral hazard by exposing taxpayers to risk, and unfairly advantage a single co-operative over other businesses. This intervention misallocates capital, encourages rent-seeking, and contradicts free market principles. The precedent of bailing out specific entities undermines economic resilience and penalizes productive enterprises that lack political favor.

Defines what constitutes a 'letter' for Canada Post Corporation Act purposes, establishing mass limits (500g) and extensive exemptions for various types of communications and documents.

Creates artificial monopoly by defining 'letter' narrowly to exclude competitive services, protecting Canada Post from market competition while consumers pay higher prices and wait longer for basic mail services. The extensive exemptions demonstrate that the definition serves regulatory capture rather than public interest.

Imposes a fee structure for advance rulings on petroleum incentives, charging $50/hour with a $250 minimum for processing applications under the Petroleum Incentives Program Act.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead that deters legitimate business inquiries and adds compliance costs without providing proportional value to taxpayers. The fee structure itself becomes a barrier to accessing government programs, contradicting the stated goal of encouraging petroleum development.