Browse regulations

Prescribes small manufacturers (annual production <= $50,000) for an exemption from consumption/sales tax on production equipment, under the Excise Tax Act.

Obsolete pre-GST regulation; the $50k threshold creates growth disincentives and market distortions, and adds unnecessary administrative burden.

This Order establishes the fee structure for certification services related to films and video tapes under the Income Tax Regulations. Initial certification fees are 0.1% of the film production budget (minimum $25, maximum $500). Review fees are fixed at $500 for short productions (<75 minutes) and $1,500 for feature productions (≥75 minutes). The fees apply to private sector applicants and are tied to a certification requirement that likely affects eligibility for tax benefits.

The fee regulation perpetuates a government certification regime that distorts the film production market, increases costs, and creates barriers to entry. The unseen consequence is that it contributes to Canada's regulatory burden and uncompetitive environment, potentially driving film investment and creative talent to jurisdictions with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Even if the fee structure is relatively modest, its existence validates a system where private producers must seek government permission and pay for the privilege to engage in creative enterprise.

Complex industry-specific tax regulations under the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act providing definitions, deductions, calculations, and delegated powers for petroleum and gas exploration, development, and production. Contains numerous obsolete provisions referencing historical programs and dates (1970s-1980s), with many sections explicitly revoked.

Creates unnecessary complexity and market distortions through industry-specific tax breaks and preferential treatment (e.g., Petro-Canada as prescribed person). Imposes compliance burdens while interfering with efficient resource allocation. The regulation is largely obsolete yet continues to exemplify the interventionist industrial policy that increases costs, distorts investment decisions, and creates regulatory capture opportunities without serving any compelling public purpose that couldn't be achieved through neutral, general tax provisions.

Exempts specific small manufacturers and producers from consumption or sales tax, listing numerous categories (blacksmiths, opticians, plumbers, cider millers, custom sign makers, photographers, professionals for printed matter, design model makers, floral arrangers, field coil manufacturers, broadcasters, picture framers, microfilming services, theatre groups, potting soil producers, artisans making handmade goods, steam producers, and motorhome importers/modifiers). Includes a $50,000 annual sales threshold for certain exempt manufacturers.

The regulation's intricate categorical exemptions impose significant hidden costs: they distort markets by arbitrarily favoring certain trades, create compliance burdens, and induce perverse incentives that hinder efficiency (e.g., artisans avoiding tools to remain exempt). Crucially, they weaken the coalition for tax reform by shielding some from the sales tax's burden. A simple, uniform revenue threshold would provide the desired relief more efficiently and neutrally.

This regulation establishes zoning restrictions around Fort St. John Airport to ensure aviation safety by controlling building heights, restricting land use, and preventing bird attractants within approach and transitional surfaces.

This is a classic example of regulatory overreach that stifles property rights and economic development. The restrictions on building heights and land use extend far beyond what's necessary for safety, preventing landowners from using their property productively. The bird disposal ban is particularly problematic as it interferes with legitimate agricultural and waste management operations. These costs are imposed on all affected landowners regardless of whether they pose any actual aviation risk, creating artificial scarcity and driving up property values in the region.

This regulation authorizes the New Brunswick Hog Marketing Board to control hog marketing in interprovincial and export trade, including setting levies, creating reserves, and equalizing payments among producers. It essentially creates a provincial marketing board with quasi-monopolistic powers over hog producers.

Creates a state-sanctioned cartel that restricts free trade between provinces and with foreign markets, artificially inflating prices and reducing supply. The equalization mechanisms and reserve funds distort market signals and prevent efficient resource allocation. Interprovincial trade barriers like this one harm Canadian competitiveness by fragmenting what should be a single market.

Designates specific Quebec and Ontario municipalities as 'special areas' for industrial renewal from April 8, 1982 to March 31, 1986, approving plans for economic expansion and social development that provide government assistance under the Canadian Industrial Renewal Regulations and Industrial and Regional Development Regulations.

Already expired (terminated March 31, 1986) and represents the very regulatory mindset we oppose: government attempts to centrally plan economic development through subsidies and geographic favoritism. Even when active, such interventions distort market signals, misallocate capital, create dependency, and penalize unselected regions. True prosperity comes from uniform low taxes, minimal regulation, and free movement of capital—not bureaucrats designating 'special areas.'

Establishes a Foreign Claims Commission to evaluate and pay claims by Canadian citizens for property expropriated by China between 1949-1981, using funds from a 1981 bilateral agreement and transferred War Claims assets. Contains eligibility rules, award limits ($100k max), and payment procedures. Time-bound process with claim deadline of Oct 20, 1981.

This regulation is a historical relic from 1981 with all key deadlines passed (claim filing deadline Oct 20, 1981; evidence deadline June 1, 1982). It serves no active purpose, likely has zero remaining claims, and maintaining obsolete regulations adds unnecessary complexity to the statute book. The bureaucratic apparatus and fund transfers are frozen artifacts that should be formally repealed to clean up Canada's regulatory inventory.

This regulation authorizes the Minister of National Defence to appoint staff to the Non-Public Funds of the Canadian Forces, which are self-funded military welfare activities (e.g., exchanges, messes).

The regulation perpetuates government competition with private enterprise, crowding out market provision of goods and services to military personnel and distorting resource allocation.

This order excludes all positions and employees of the Non-Public Funds Staff of the Canadian Forces from the Public Service Employment Act, effectively removing them from standard public service hiring, employment, and labor regulations.

Creates a parallel employment system that undermines merit-based hiring, transparency, and accountability. Exempts military personnel from standard employment protections while potentially enabling favoritism, inefficiency, and reduced oversight. The stated purpose of supporting military families could be achieved through standard public service mechanisms without creating a regulatory black hole.

Regulation prescribes specific tax rates for natural gas and gas liquids (ethane, propane, butanes) for very limited historical periods in 1983-1984, with rates dropping to zero after January 31, 1984. Also defines exempt uses and sources of marketable pipeline gas.

Obsolete by over 40 years. Set temporary tax rates that expired in 1984 (all final rates are $0). Serves no current purpose, only adds legal clutter, creates confusion, and imposes unnecessary compliance burdens. Hayekian principle: regulations must be time-limited and reviewed; this one's sunset passed before most current Canadians were born.

Airport zoning regulations for Norman Wells Airport establishing height restrictions, approach surfaces, and land use controls to ensure aviation safety around the airport.

Aviation safety requires these regulations to prevent obstructions that could interfere with aircraft takeoffs, landings, and approaches. Without these height restrictions and land use controls, buildings, structures, or natural growth could create hazards for pilots and passengers. The approach surface limitations are critical for maintaining safe glide paths and preventing collisions during critical flight phases.

Establishes a fee schedule for broadcast technical data services provided by the Minister of Communications, with different fees for initial subscriptions, renewals/updates, and special requests.

Deleting it would create uncertainty about costs for essential government-provided technical data services, potentially leading to underfunding and reduced availability that could harm broadcasters and Canada's media infrastructure.

The regulation consists solely of sections 1-5, all marked as repealed by SOR/2006-310, section 5. No active provisions remain.

The regulation is already repealed and therefore obsolete. Maintaining repealed provisions in regulatory compilations creates confusion, wastes administrative resources, and imposes unnecessary compliance burdens on Canadians who must still navigate the appearance of active rules. Repealed regulations should be removed entirely to ensure legal clarity and reduce regulatory clutter.

Regulation implements the International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) for containers used in international transport. Requires safety approval plates, periodic examinations (max 30 months), Board approval of examination procedures, authorization of inspection organizations, record-keeping, and gives inspectors detention powers for non-compliant or unsafe containers.

The regulation imposes excessive bureaucratic costs: mandatory Board approval of examination procedures, authorization of inspection organizations, and detailed record-keeping create barriers to entry, reduce competition, and increase compliance costs for container owners. These costs are largely unnecessary because the CSC standards themselves provide a clear, internationally recognized framework; private certification and liability mechanisms could ensure compliance more efficiently. The detention powers enable arbitrary government interference with private property. The unseen effects include reduced market dynamism, regulatory capture risk, and chilling effects on international trade participation due to domestic compliance burdens, ultimately harming Canadian competitiveness and consumer welfare through higher costs and reduced supply.