Browse regulations

These regulations establish imaginary airport protection surfaces (approach, outer, and transitional surfaces) around Boundary Bay Airport in Delta, BC. They prohibit construction or natural growth that penetrates these surfaces and ban waste disposal that could attract birds to the area, all to ensure aviation safety by maintaining clear flight paths and reducing bird strike risks.

Canadians would be measurably worse off if deleted: this regulation protects human life and property by preventing obstructions in aircraft approach/departure paths and reducing bird strike hazards. Aviation safety requires precise, enforceable height restrictions that cannot be achieved through voluntary measures or tort law alone. The regulation employs technically-established standards (ICAO/DOT) that are the proven, cost-effective means of protecting hundreds of thousands of annual flights. Removing these specific, binding restrictions would create unacceptable safety risks and likely lead to insurance unavailability for the airport.

The Prospector's Assistance Terms and Conditions Order establishes a government program providing financial aid to prospectors in Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories, covering expenses up to $3,500 per prospector for field work, with oversight from specialized boards and review committees to ensure proper use of funds and prospecting activities.

This regulation creates a costly government subsidy program that distorts market incentives, favors certain prospectors over others, and imposes bureaucratic oversight that could be better handled by private industry associations. The program's administrative costs likely exceed any benefits, while creating dependency on government assistance rather than fostering genuine entrepreneurial risk-taking in mineral exploration.

General Import Permit No. 7 authorizes personal, non-commercial imports of limited turkey quantities: one whole turkey, up to 10kg of parts, turkey poults, or canned turkey. Requires specific endorsement on customs forms when required.

Imposes unnecessary administrative burden and government control over trivial personal imports. The labeling requirement adds compliance costs for what should be a matter of personal liberty. Such micro-regulation of individual consumption choices contradicts the principle that citizens should be free from arbitrary permissions for personal property. The economic costs of enforcement and processing outweigh any marginal tracking benefits, and it establishes a precedent for regulating harmless personal imports that could be eliminated without harm to Canadians.

Regulation establishes the framework for crown corporations (Schedules III and IV) to make payments in lieu of property and business occupancy taxes to municipalities. It defines 'corporation property', 'corporation effective rate', and 'corporation property value', sets minimum payment amounts based on what would be owed if the property were taxable, allows deductions for direct service provision, and outlines payment timing and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Imposes significant bureaucratic overhead by forcing crown corporations to mimic private tax calculations through complex, rigid formulas that distort resource allocation and investment decisions. It creates deadweight losses through compliance costs, assessment bureaucracy, and ministerial dispute resolution, while entrenching a property tax system that already distorts housing and development. The regulation adds no net wealth; it merely shifts money between government entities while penalizing economically-sensible decisions based on arbitrary tax mimicry rather than market prices.

Airport safety regulation establishing imaginary approach, outer, and transitional surfaces around Vancouver International Airport to prevent obstructions and bird hazards; prohibits building construction exceeding these surfaces and waste accumulation that attracts birds; allowsMinister to order removal of excessive natural growth.

Canadians would be worse off without it because it prevents catastrophic aviation accidents by ensuring clear airspace around a major transportation hub. The regulation addresses a critical externality: individual landowners lack proper incentives to account for risks their structures pose to thousands of passengers and public safety. Reactive tort law cannot substitute for preventive zoning—waiting for accidents before acting is intolerable. The modest land-use restrictions are a necessary condition for safe, efficient air navigation that benefits all Canadians.

Regulation establishes height and use restrictions on lands surrounding Comox Airport to protect aviation safety. It prohibits structures or objects that penetrate defined imaginary surfaces (approach, outer, transitional) extending from runways, orders removal of excessive natural growth, and bans bird-attractive waste disposal. Applies to a geographically defined area around the airport.

Deletion would create unacceptable aviation safety risks. The regulation prevents obstructions in flight paths and bird hazards that could cause catastrophic crashes with massive loss of life and economic disruption. These safety benefits cannot be adequately achieved through private liability or voluntary agreements because the externalities of an aircraft accident are too diffuse and severe for market mechanisms to adequately deter risky development. The regulation is narrowly tailored to a specific airport with precise technical boundaries.

Establishes a provincial marketing board to regulate potato marketing, including interprovincial and export trade, with authority to impose mandatory levies on producers and marketers, and equalize payments.

Creates interprovincial trade barriers, imposes costly mandatory levies, entrenches bureaucratic control over voluntary market exchange, and prevents efficient supply allocation. This cartel-like system reduces competition, increases producer costs, and distorts price signals, contrary to free market principles that maximize prosperity through voluntary coordination.

A provincial marketing board scheme that centralizes the packing, storage, and marketing of British Columbia mushrooms for interprovincial and export trade, requiring licensing for all participants and restricting direct sales between producers and buyers.

This regulation creates a cartel that restricts supply, increases prices, and reduces market competition. It imposes licensing requirements that create barriers to entry, mandates that all mushrooms be sold through a single agency, and prohibits direct transactions between producers and buyers. These restrictions artificially inflate costs for consumers, limit farmer autonomy, and prevent more efficient market arrangements from emerging. The scheme benefits a small group of producers at the expense of consumers and potential new market entrants.

A Manitoba order establishing a one-cent per pullet levy on producers marketing pullets in interprovincial and export trade, with reporting requirements to the Manitoba Egg Producers' Marketing Board.

This regulation creates a trade barrier that increases costs for producers and reduces market efficiency. The one-cent levy represents a direct tax on interprovincial commerce, making it more expensive for producers to operate across provincial boundaries. Such levies distort market signals, reduce supply, and ultimately increase prices for consumers while limiting producers' ability to deploy their talents efficiently.

The Human Rights Tribunal Appeal Regulations provide procedural rules for appealing decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal, including methods of service and the requirement to use a specified form for the notice of appeal.

Canadians would be worse off without a clear, standardized appeal process, which ensures due process and access to justice. The regulation achieves this in a way that would be hard to replicate without it, providing certainty and fairness in challenging tribunal decisions.

The Manitoba Pullet Order authorizes the Manitoba Egg Producers' Marketing Board to control interprovincial and export marketing of pullets, set levies, classify producers, and manage revenue for equalization and expenses under the Natural Products Marketing Act.

Creates a state-sanctioned monopoly that restricts supply, raises consumer prices, and eliminates competition. The market-distorting effects—higher costs for families, barriers to entry, and inefficiency—outweigh any purported benefits to producers, which could be achieved through private means without compulsion.

These Regulations provide a customs duty drawback (refund) to Canadian stuffed toy manufacturers who use imported toy skins, with the rate of refund adjusted based on the manufacturer's use of Canadian fabrics versus imported materials. The scheme incentivizes the use of Canadian-made fabrics by offering higher drawback rates when Canadian fabric costs exceed 55% of the duty-paid value of imported skins. Claims are time-limited and subject to verification.

This is an obsolete, industry-specific subsidy that distorts market competition and creates artificial incentives for stuffed toy manufacturers to favor Canadian fabrics. The regulation references historical periods from 1978-1986 and serves no legitimate public purpose in a free market. It benefits only a narrow subset of manufacturers at taxpayer expense, adding administrative burden without justification. The market, not government rebates, should determine material sourcing decisions.

Ontario soya-bean marketing levies order establishing a $1 per tonne levy on soya-bean producers for interprovincial and export trade, administered by the Ontario Soya-Bean Growers' Marketing Board.

This levy creates artificial price distortions and reduces market efficiency by imposing mandatory fees on producers. The $1 per tonne cost reduces competitiveness, increases compliance burden, and restricts free market pricing mechanisms. Soya-bean farmers should be free to market their products without government-mandated levies that benefit only a specific marketing board rather than the broader agricultural sector.

Federal regulation providing government insurance covering up to 90% of private loans (max $2M aggregate) to Trident Aircraft Ltd., with lenders paying a 1% annual fee, funded through Industry, Trade and Commerce Vote No. 1 of Appropriation Act No. 2, 1978-79.

Corporate welfare that distorts markets and misallocates capital. Government guarantees create moral hazard, making Trident Aircraft Ltd. and its lenders more reckless with taxpayer-backstopped risk. This privileged treatment violates equal competition, crowds out superior competitors, and sets a dangerous precedent for crony capitalism. The $2M cap and 1% fee are negligible compared to systemic damage to market discipline and taxpayer exposure.

These Regulations prescribe standardized cost calculation methods for Canadian railway companies, particularly for calculating 'actual loss' in abandonment proceedings and variable costs for rate-setting. They define cost categories (I-IV), mandate specific depreciation and cost-of-capital allowances, and require filings using Uniform Classification of Accounts and Committee-approved costing manuals.

The regulation creates a bureaucratic overlay that distorts entrepreneurial calculation by mandating artificial cost allocations and cost-of-capital inclusions. This inflates the apparent costs of operating lines, facilitating subsidies for unprofitable operations and preventing market-driven abandonment decisions. The prescribed methods override market-based price signals, increase compliance burdens, and institutionalize regulatory capture by allowing the Committee to determine 'appropriate' rates of return and acceptable depreciation methods. The unseen cost is the suppression of economically efficient railway restructuring that would occur if companies were free to calculate costs according to their own business needs and market realities.