Browse regulations

Alberta's Foreign Ownership of Land Regulations restrict non-Canadian citizens and foreign-controlled entities from acquiring interests in rural agricultural land, with exceptions for limited parcels, leases up to 20 years, and specific purposes like industrial development, residential use, or infrastructure projects.

These regulations create artificial barriers to capital investment in Alberta's agricultural sector, reducing land values, limiting development opportunities, and preventing efficient allocation of resources. They discriminate based on national origin rather than merit, ultimately harming Canadian landowners by restricting their ability to sell to willing buyers and reducing economic growth in rural communities.

Regulations requiring energy companies to report toll information to the National Energy Board, including rate of return, material changes from forecasts, and calculations explaining variances. Provides exemptions for companies with no material changes and allows the Board to request additional information when needed.

These regulations create costly compliance burdens without clear consumer benefits, distort market pricing mechanisms, and enable regulatory capture. Companies waste resources on extensive reporting that could be spent on infrastructure or lower prices. The Board's ability to demand additional information creates uncertainty and discourages investment in energy infrastructure. Market competition would naturally provide price signals and performance information without regulatory oversight.

Order establishes marketing boards with authority to regulate interprovincial and export trade of 12 specified vegetables (beans, beets, cabbage, carrots, cauliflower, corn, cucumbers, peas, pumpkins, squash, tomatoes) and impose mandatory levies on producers/processors for price equalization and board expenses.

Mandatory levies and interprovincial trade regulation distort market signals, raise costs, reduce competition, and violate property rights. The price equalization scheme substitutes central planning for voluntary exchange, creating inefficiency and harming consumers and would-be entrants.

Establishes a marketing board for Ontario asparagus growers, granting authority to regulate interprovincial and export trade, impose levies on producers, and equalize revenues among producers. The board can classify producers into groups and set different levy amounts, using funds for operational expenses, reserves, and revenue redistribution.

This regulation creates a government-enforced marketing monopoly that restricts voluntary trade between provinces, imposes coercive levies on producers, and artificially redistributes income—undermining property rights, distorting market signals, and limiting consumer choice. It prevents asparagus growers from freely negotiating sales and forces them to fund board operations and cross-subsidize other producers, reducing incentives for efficiency and innovation while raising costs throughout the supply chain.

This regulation grants the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) legal capacities and privileges/immunities in Canada similar to those of the United Nations, including for representatives, officials, and experts performing missions for the organization.

International organizations require legal capacity and diplomatic privileges to effectively perform their functions. Removing these privileges would hinder the FAO's ability to operate in Canada, potentially damaging international relations and Canada's role in global food security initiatives.

Aviation safety zoning regulation for Charlo Airport restricting building heights and bird-attracting activities within defined imaginary approach surfaces, outer surfaces, and transitional surfaces to protect aircraft operations from obstructions and wildlife hazards.

Deleting this regulation would endanger aircraft and passengers by allowing hazardous obstructions near an airport, creating externalities that are difficult to remedy through liability alone. The regulation prevents catastrophic risks in a cost-effective, certain manner that would be impossible to replicate through market mechanisms given the high stakes and multiple contributors to risk. Canadians would be worse off with degraded aviation safety at a critical public infrastructure facility.

This Order grants tax remission to Indian residents on royalties and technical service fees, reducing the effective withholding tax rate from 30% to 20% as specified in the Canada-India tax treaty.

This regulation creates inequitable tax treatment, distorting economic decisions by favoring Indian residents over others. It adds complexity to the tax code and picks winners through government decree rather than letting market forces operate freely. The unseen cost includes misallocation of capital and reduced competitiveness as businesses structure transactions to capture preferential treatment rather than optimal efficiency.

These regulations establish conversion rates between gold francs, SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), and Canadian dollars for purposes of the Canada Shipping Act, specifying that gold francs convert to SDRs at 15.075 per SDR, with SDRs then converting to Canadian dollars at the IMF-established rate.

This regulation is obsolete; gold francs are no longer a recognized currency unit and the conversion mechanism serves no practical purpose in modern shipping law. Keeping obsolete regulations unnecessarily complicates the regulatory framework, creates potential for confusion, and imposes dead-weight compliance costs without any benefit to Canadians. The regulation achieves no legitimate contemporary objective and should be repealed entirely.

These are procedural rules governing criminal appeals in the Northwest Territories, establishing filing deadlines, required forms, evidence submission protocols, and bail application procedures for the Court of Appeal.

These rules provide essential due process protections and procedural certainty in criminal appeals. Deleting them would create legal chaos, violate fundamental rights to appeal, and undermine the rule of law by removing standardized procedures necessary for fair justice.

Zoning regulations for Sept-Iles Airport establishing height restrictions, approach surfaces, and transitional surfaces to ensure aviation safety by controlling building heights and natural growth in the airport's vicinity.

Aviation safety requires standardized height restrictions around airports to prevent collisions. Without these regulations, buildings and natural growth could interfere with aircraft approaches and departures, creating direct safety risks for passengers and crew. The costs of potential accidents far outweigh the restrictions on property development.

Authorizes the British Columbia Mushroom Marketing Board to regulate mushroom marketing in interprovincial and export trade, including setting levies and charges, creating reserves, and equalizing payments among producers.

Creates a marketing board monopoly that restricts supply, raises prices, and imposes regulatory costs on producers. The intended goal of orderly marketing is outweighed by reduced competition, higher consumer prices, and barriers to market entry for new mushroom growers.

Extends the Public Service Employment Act to all non-seasonal/term employees of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration, overriding subsection 6(2) of its parent Act.

Civil service employment protections impose rigid hiring/firing rules, inflate costs, and reduce accountability. These barriers to efficient management waste tax dollars and prevent optimal deployment of staff, with no compelling public interest justification that outweighs the substantial efficiency losses.

Special regulatory provision establishing unique insurance fee payment schedule for Canada Cycle and Motor Company Limited loans up to $12M, overriding standard Enterprise Development Regulations with specific semi-annual instalment requirements including a delayed payment schedule for 1978-1979 period.

This regulation creates an unjustifiable special privilege for a single company, violating the principle of equal treatment under the law. It distorts market competition by giving Canada Cycle and Motor Company Limited advantages not available to other borrowers, violating the free market principles of merit-based competition. The regulation represents crony capitalism where government picks winners and losers, and its removal would restore fairness and equal opportunity for all market participants. The stated purpose could be achieved through voluntary contractual arrangements without government intervention.

The Canadian Manufactured Goods Exported Drawback Regulations provide for refund of customs duties, sales taxes, and excise taxes paid on imported parts/materials used in manufacturing goods that are subsequently exported. The system aims to prevent Canadian exporters from bearing costs that their foreign competitors don't face, with adjustments for by-products/scrap and exclusions for goods used prior to export or subject to anti-dumping duties. Claims require extensive documentation, waivers from other potential claimants, and must be filed within 4 years.

This regulation imposes significant administrative burdens and bureaucratic friction on Canadian exporters through complex documentation requirements, mandatory waivers, and intricate calculations for by-products/scrap. The 4-year limitation and anti-dumping reductions add further complexity. While the goal of preventing 'taxes on exports' is sound (exporters shouldn't bear costs that foreign competitors avoid), the implementation is heavy-handed and prescriptive rather than allowing market-based solutions or simpler administrative approaches. The compliance costs disproportionately harm smaller manufacturers and create barriers to entry. Canada could achieve the same objective - export competitiveness - through tax policy reforms or streamlined drawback systems with minimal bureaucratic intervention, consistent with Hayek's knowledge problem: central planners cannot efficiently determine optimal documentation requirements or waiver protocols across diverse industries.

This regulation governs the interprovincial and export marketing of fresh grapes from Ontario. It requires extensive reporting (monthly sales/shipping/transportation returns, daily tally returns), mandates that shippers and dealer-shippers be 'appointed' by the Ontario Fresh Grape Growers' Marketing Board, requires detailed producer receipts, and grants the Board broad inspection powers over records. It creates an information and control regime over a specific agricultural product's trade across provincial boundaries.

This regulation violates interprovincial trade freedom, imposes severe administrative burdens on grape businesses, and creates a licensing system that restricts who can participate in the market. The reporting requirements benefit only the Board's monitoring functions while raising costs for all participants, reducing competitiveness, and creating barriers to entry. There is no legitimate public interest that justifies controlling grape shipments—this is pure market centralization that reduces supply, increases costs, and prevents Canadians from freely trading agricultural goods across provinces, contrary to the principle of national economic union. The information collected provides no offsetting benefit that cannot be achieved through voluntary market arrangements.