Browse regulations

1967 regulation transferring the Sydney Pilots' Pension Fund to the federal Superannuation Account, with provisions for calculating pensionable service and contributions for pilots who became public servants on October 1, 1966. A one-time administrative transfer mechanism.

Obsolete 1967 transition regulation that directed actions to be completed by March 1968. Retaining it serves no practical purpose and contributes to regulatory clutter. Its provisions have been fully executed and are irrelevant to modern operations.

These regulations govern the operation and use of Canadian Vickers Limited's two dry docks (The Duke of Connaught and The General Georges P. Vanier). They establish fees, booking procedures, operational rules for vessels, liability allocations, and safety requirements specifically for this single private company's facilities. The regulations include detailed requirements for vessel owners, including entry applications, fee payments, compliance with dock-master orders, and penalties for non-compliance.

These regulations are a clear case of corporate favoritism and regulatory capture. They grant a specific private company (Canadian Vickers Limited) monopoly power over dry dock services, enforced by government regulation. This violates free market principles by using state authority to shield one business from competition, distorting the maritime repair market, and creating artificial barriers to entry for other potential dry dock operators. The regulation improperly elevates a private company's operational rules to the force of law, restricting Canadians' liberty to contract freely and choose service providers. Such cronyist interventions prevent market competition that would lower costs, improve quality, and increase supply. The regulations should be repealed entirely, allowing dry dock services to operate under standard contract law and open competition.

These regulations allow Canadian Forces members who missed the deadline to elect pensionable service due to erroneous advice to make a late election within one year of notification, counting that service and requiring contributions as per the original pension rules.

Deletion would cause financial harm to military personnel who relied on erroneous government advice, depriving them of pension benefits they would have earned but for the error; the regulation provides an essential, targeted mechanism to correct such administrative failures.

1966 regulation establishing administrative process to distribute $40,000 Bulgarian settlement to Canadians whose pre-1966 property was nationalized. Creates Foreign Claims Fund, payment procedures, and advisory apparatus.

Effectively obsolete. Claim filing deadline was June 30, 1966 - 60 years ago. All legitimate claims should have been resolved long ago. Maintaining Ministers, Adviser, and Treasury Board oversight for a one-time historical settlement serves no public interest and represents unnecessary bureaucratic overhead. The regulation should have been repealed decades ago after claims were settled.

Transitional assistance program for auto workers displaced by the 1965 Canada-US Automotive Products Agreement. Provides supplemental benefits up to 156 weeks for lay-offs between April 1966 and June 1973, bridging gap to 62-75% of previous earnings.

Obsolete with no remaining beneficiaries. Keeping it imposes real costs: regulatory clutter and confusion in statute books, administrative burden of maintaining dead-letter provisions, and harmful precedent for industry-specific subsidies that distort labor markets and extend benefits beyond standard unemployment insurance. These costs outweigh any value; repeal reduces regulatory burden and reaffirms that temporary interventions must expire.

This regulation allows military personnel who previously contributed to older pension systems to transfer their service periods to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act by paying required contributions.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it protects the retirement benefits of military personnel who served under previous pension systems, ensuring they can consolidate their service records and receive appropriate pension credits for their years of service.

These regulations provide special superannuation benefits to Canadian Forces members compulsorily retired due to force reductions between May 1964 and May 1966, treating them as if they had 20+ years of service for pension purposes if they would otherwise receive reduced benefits.

Creates a privileged class of retirees based on arbitrary timing rather than merit or service, distorting pension system incentives and creating unfair distinctions between similarly situated service members.

Regulation allows specific WWII-era British/Commonwealth military nursing services and Royal Navy T124/T124X agreements to be counted as pensionable under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, requiring contributor elections within one year and contributions based on specified clauses.

Imposes ongoing taxpayer liability for a narrow historical cohort with no public interest justification. Creates administrative burden, expands government pension obligations beyond core Canadian service, and establishes precedent for retroactive benefit claims on obscure Commonwealth military service from decades past.

This regulation grants the Ontario Onion Growers' Marketing Board authority to regulate onion marketing in interprovincial and export trade, mirroring its powers within Ontario under Regulation 334/61, effectively creating a supply-managed system for onions that restricts free trade and market competition.

This regulation creates a cartel that restricts onion supply, raises prices for consumers, limits farmer autonomy, and imposes bureaucratic overhead. It prevents efficient market allocation of onions across provinces and internationally, protecting incumbent producers at the expense of consumers and innovative farmers who could serve markets more effectively.

Regulation governs the transition of Canadian Arsenals Limited employees from a company pension fund to the Public Service Superannuation Act system, with specific election deadlines (1962-1970), mandatory liquidation of fund assets by 1968, and rules for pension payments from the Superannuation Account.

Obsolete regulation with all deadlines long passed; maintaining it creates unnecessary legal complexity and regulatory burden with no current benefit, as the transition it addressed is complete and any residual matters should fall under general pension laws.

Historical pension transfer regulations for Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation (C.O.T.C.) employees transitioning from private pension plans (Standard Life and UK plans) to the Public Service Superannuation Act, with specific payment formulas, interest rates, and deadlines all dated 1961-1966.

This regulation is manifestly obsolete, dealing with a one-time pension transition finalized by 1966. All dates have long passed, C.O.T.C. and referenced 'former employers' are historical entities, and it serves no current legal function, merely cluttering the statute books.

The regulation precisely describes the boundaries of three specific parcels of federal land: a 5.48-acre field at the Dominion Experimental Farm in British Columbia, a 32.75-acre portion of Camp Petawawa Reserve in Ontario, and a 200-acre parcel including Lac Leblanc in Gatineau Park, Quebec.

Deletion would create legal uncertainty over federal land boundaries, potentially leading to disputes, mismanagement, or loss of public assets. The precise legal descriptions ensure clear title and effective administration of these properties, which is difficult to achieve otherwise.

This Order grants the Quebec Apple Growers' Marketing Board authority to regulate interprovincial and export marketing of Quebec-grown apples, allowing them to exercise the same powers they use for local marketing within Quebec (with some exceptions). It establishes a marketing board system that controls how apples from Quebec can be sold outside the province.

This regulation creates an interprovincial trade barrier that violates the principle of free movement of goods between provinces. Marketing boards restrict supply, increase consumer prices, and prevent efficient market allocation. The costs to Canadians—higher prices, reduced choice, and fragmented national markets—far outweigh any benefits to a small group of producers. Such supply management systems are precisely the type of regulatory burden that drives brain drain and reduces competitiveness.

Federal regulation from 1958 that sets complex formulas for increasing pensions for federal public service employees, RCMP, military personnel, and their survivors (widows, children, orphans). It calculates increases based on service periods, imposes caps ($3000 for widows who are also employees, $640 discretionary limit), and has special rules for multiple pension recipients and Newfoundland service exclusions.

This 1958 regulation represents bureaucratic complexity and arbitrary caps that distort pension calculations for federal retirees. It imposes unnecessary administrative burdens, creates perverse incentives (e.g., penalizing those with multiple modest pensions), and entrenches inequitable distinctions. The intricate formulas and means-testing create disincentives for continued service and penalize survivors. Such detailed prescription belongs in legislation or pension plan documents, not regulation—and even then should be replaced with simple, transparent formulas. The costs of compliance and confusion outweigh any marginal benefit this Byzantine framework provides.

The Dominion Succession Duty (1957) Regulations prescribe Ontario and Quebec for purposes of the Dominion Succession Duty Act, enabling federal estate taxation on transfers at death.

These regulations are obsolete following the federal elimination of estate taxes in 1972 and the complete phase-out of succession duties across all provinces by the early 1980s. Keeping them creates legal confusion and unnecessary regulatory clutter. Even if still applicable, estate taxes constitute double-taxation of already-taxed income, distort savings and investment incentives, force asset sales to pay taxes, and drive wealth mobility—contrary to principles of property rights and economic liberty.