Browse regulations

These Regulations provide taxpayer-funded subsidies (9-20% of construction costs) and contributions (up to 3%) to Canadian shipbuilders who construct ships in Canada, with conditions such as using Canadian materials when available and submitting to improvement plans. The program has explicit expiry dates: no contributions for applications after March 31, 1990, with all improvement project costs to be incurred by December 31, 1990 and claimed by March 31, 1991.

This regulation is expired and obsolete on its face (deadlines passed in 1990-91). Even when active, it represented corporate welfare that distorted market signals, raised costs by mandating Canadian content, and taxed productive Canadians to shield inefficient shipbuilders from competition. Wealth is created by voluntary exchange, not subsidies; deleting this decades-dead regulation would have zero negative effect while removing a relic of mercantilist thinking that protects special interests at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Federal shipbuilding subsidy program (1966-1973) providing capital subsidies of 17-35% to domestic shipbuilders and owners for commercial and fishing vessels, with ownership requirements and compliance audits.

Distorts market signals, creates dependency on government subsidies, and misallocates capital from more productive uses. The subsidies artificially lower shipbuilding costs while the ownership requirements restrict market freedom, ultimately raising consumer prices and reducing innovation in the shipping industry.

These Regulations provide for interest payments at 1% quarterly on contributions to the Public Service Superannuation Account that have been deposited for at least two years and whose associated election is void, with exceptions for amounts paid before April 1, 1967.

The regulation imposes unnecessary administrative burdens and fiscal costs, creates perverse incentives for delayed returns, and is an obsolete relic with negligible benefit to prosperity or liberty.

These Regulations establish a grant system compensating provinces and municipalities for the tax-exempt status of federal property. Federal property is constitutionally immune from provincial property taxes. Grants are calculated by applying the local effective tax rate to the accepted value of federal property, with discretionary deductions for services. The Minister has wide discretion, and grants are not automatic. The system aims to equalize fiscal impacts and prevent local taxpayers from subsidizing federal operations.

Deleting this regulation would force municipalities to fund services for federal properties through higher taxes on other properties, unfairly burdening local taxpayers. The grant system ensures that the federal government contributes its fair share to local services despite constitutional immunity. This intergovernmental fiscal coordination cannot be efficiently replicated through market mechanisms due to the public-good nature of municipal services and the need for predictable revenue. While the system involves bureaucracy, it prevents greater distortions and inequities.

This 1977 regulation establishes a government reimbursement program for railway companies providing employee benefits during passenger service changes (1977-1990). It mandates special agreements between railways and trade unions with binding arbitration, provides for up to 100% federal reimbursement of prescribed costs, and includes detailed provisions for job security, relocation, training, and severance. The regulation applies specifically to the period when VIA Rail was created and passenger services were being restructured.

This regulation is obsolete (expired 1990) and represents corporate welfare that distorts market signals. Even when active, it forced taxpayers to subsidize private railway restructuring costs, creating moral hazard and preventing market discipline. The binding arbitration regime and mandated benefit packages increased labor costs permanently, reducing rail competitiveness and flexibility. Such industry-specific subsidies misallocate capital away from productive uses and violate the principle that businesses should bear their own transition costs.

Federal reimbursement program compensating provinces for 40% of payments to animal owners whose animals died from rabies, with per-animal payment caps (cattle $400, horses $200, sheep/swine/goats $80) requiring veterinary certification.

This addresses a critical public health externality: rabies control requires farmer cooperation, and without compensation farmers would hide cases or resist control measures, jeopardizing both animal and human health. The cost-sharing structure aligns federal/provincial incentives while certification prevents abuse—a solution private markets wouldn't provide for this rare but catastrophic risk.

1975 regulation establishing import compensation for petroleum importers to offset costs from international price changes, administered by Energy Supplies Allocation Board with price controls and eligibility requirements.

Creates market distortions by subsidizing imports based on international price fluctuations, imposes price controls through mandatory price maintenance undertakings, and establishes a complex bureaucracy with unintended costs including reduced market efficiency and distorted incentives for domestic energy production.

Federal-provincial cost-sharing program where Canada pays contributions to provinces with universal nursing home care benefit programs. Contributions calculated using base-year costs adjusted for inflation and senior population growth. Programs must provide universal access without financial means testing (with limited exceptions). Includes reporting, audit, and payment mechanisms.

Suppresses private long-term care alternatives, creates moral hazard through universal provision regardless of need, adds bureaucratic overhead, and reduces supply and innovation by favoring government provision over market-based solutions. The cost-based funding formula incentivizes maintaining the status quo rather than improving efficiency or responsiveness to patient needs.

Federal subsidy program providing up to 40% grants for mineral and oil/gas exploration in northern Canada, requiring drilling and repayment upon production, with complex ownership restrictions and Canadian citizen/corporate eligibility requirements.

Creates market distortions by subsidizing exploration that would otherwise be uneconomical, artificially lowering capital costs for select companies while creating barriers for others through complex eligibility rules. The repayment mechanism upon production creates perverse incentives where government effectively takes equity stakes in successful ventures while taxpayers bear losses on failures.

Federal regulation authorizing grants to municipalities in lieu of development/redevelopment taxes on federal property, compensating municipalities for tax exemptions and perpetuating the development tax system.

This regulation sustains harmful development taxes that suppress supply, increase costs, and distort incentives. It creates federal bureaucracy and discretion while subsidizing municipal tax schemes that impede development and housing affordability.

Federal regulation governing long-term leasing of specific Ottawa lands, requiring Treasury Board approval for leases over 50 years, establishing leasehold acquisition by Her Majesty, limiting subleases to 20 years without approval, requiring Finance Minister approval for banking purposes, mandating rent calculations based on costs and market value, and requiring public advertisement for subleases unless impractical.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles for commercial property development, imposes arbitrary term limits that restrict market flexibility, and mandates cost-based rent calculations that may not reflect true market conditions. The public advertisement requirement adds compliance costs without clear benefit, while the multiple ministerial approvals create regulatory bottlenecks that discourage investment in federal properties.

Regulation establishes a pre-retirement benefit for footwear and tanning workers aged 54-65 laid off due to import competition between 1976-1982. Provides 66.67% of average weekly earnings to workers with 10+ years service (1,000 hours/year), subject to income testing. administered by federal employment commission.

This protectionist intervention shields specific workers from the normal consequences of trade, creating moral hazard and distorting labor market adjustments. It violates the principle that wealth comes from competitive markets, not government picking winners and losers. The program interferes with necessary economic reallocation, reduces incentives for worker mobility and retraining, and imposes costs on taxpayers to delay inevitable industry adjustments. Even if temporary, it establishes a harmful precedent of using public funds to insulate particular sectors from international competition, ultimately making Canada less competitive and productive.

Provides pre-retirement benefit (66.67% of average earnings) to textile/clothing workers aged 54-64 with 10+ years service, after UI exhaustion, certified as having no prospect of employment.

Industry-specific benefit distorts labor markets, creates dependency, and misallocates capital from productive uses. Unseen costs: prolonged industry stagnation, reduced worker mobility, and moral hazard that discourages employer investment in retraining.

This order establishes a quota system for Saskatchewan turkey producers, levying $0.22/kg on sales exceeding a producer's market allotment and requiring buyers to remit these penalties. It restricts interprovincial and export trade to quota holders.

This regulation artificially constrains supply, raises consumer prices, and punishes efficient producers. The quota system creates deadly interprovincial trade barriers, entrenches monopolistic privileges for existing producers, and stifles competition and innovation. The unseen costs include reduced economic efficiency, misallocation of resources, and higher living costs for Canadian families seeking affordable poultry.

Saskatchewan Turkey Order establishes a marketing board with authority to regulate turkey marketing in interprovincial and export trade, including power to impose levies, create reserves, and equalize payments among producers.

Creates monopoly marketing board that restricts free trade between provinces, imposes mandatory levies on producers, and centralizes market decisions - all reducing competition and increasing consumer prices while protecting incumbent producers from market forces.