Browse regulations

Insurance regulations for veterans covering premium payments, policy continuation, disability benefits, and fund management under the Returned Soldiers' Insurance Act

Obsolete post-WWI veterans' insurance program with complex administrative mechanisms that no longer serve any purpose, creating unnecessary regulatory burden while distorting market alternatives for veterans' insurance needs

The Regional Development Incentives Regulations, 1974 establish a subsidy and loan guarantee program for businesses establishing or expanding facilities in designated regions. It defines eligible assets (excluding land, vehicles, patents, goodwill), eligible operations (manufacturing/processing but excluding resource extraction, construction, publishing, etc.), and ties incentives to approved capital costs and/or job creation. The Minister has wide discretion over approvals, asset valuations, job counts, and compliance monitoring. Recipients must maintain specified equity levels, local hiring, Canadian supplier preferences, and continue operations for 24-36 months. Incentives are subject to clawbacks if jobs/asset use targets aren't met, assets are sold, or plans change without approval.

This industrial subsidy program imposes direct taxpayer costs while distorting capital allocation away from market signals to ministerial discretion. It creates perverse incentives for rent-seeking, locks businesses into artificial locations, imposes burdensome reporting requirements, and props up ventures that may be economically marginal without continuous support. The unseen cost is the foregone wealth from capital diverted from its most productive uses—resources that would have been deployed through voluntary exchange in response to genuine consumer demand instead flow to politically-favored projects, perpetuating misallocation and undermining the economic dynamism that free markets generate.

Designates specific regions across Canada (Atlantic provinces, northern Quebec/Ontario/Alberta, all of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, particular BC regional districts, and territories) as eligible for regional development incentives under the Regional Development Incentives Act until December 31, 1984.

Expired since 1984; geographic development subsidies misallocate capital via political direction, create dependency, distort markets, and impose hidden opportunity costs that reduce national prosperity.

The Regional Development Incentives Regulations establish a subsidy and loan guarantee program for businesses investing in designated regions. The program provides development incentives based on approved capital costs and/or job creation, with numerous ministerial discretion points, eligibility restrictions, and conditions requiring preferential local hiring, Canadian supplier preferences, and operational continuance for 30-42 months. Loan guarantees cover commercial facilities but exclude regions in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia for special incentives.

This regulation creates central planning via ministerial discretion over eligible assets, fair market values, and operational conditions. It distorts capital allocation by subsidizing politically-selected investments rather than letting market signals guide development. Geographic favoritism violates equal treatment of provinces, while conditions like mandatory local hiring and Canadian supplier preferences inject non-economic criteria into business decisions. The knowledge problem prevents bureaucrats from determining which investments truly create value, leading to malinvestment and higher taxes. Canadians are worse off through reduced economic efficiency, diverted capital, and a business climate rewarding political connections over merit.

Regulation establishes criteria for federal payments to municipalities and other recipients for preparing transportation and urban development plans, requiring ministerial approval before work begins, audit rights, and Treasury Board approval for amounts over $250,000.

This regulation channels taxpayer money into government-approved planning that enables restrictive land-use policies, zoning, and development controls that directly cause housing affordability crises. Ministers exercise discretionary power to pick 'winners,' substituting political judgment for market signals and creating dependency on federal funding for activities that should be privately funded or locally determined. The $250,000 threshold creates an arbitrary boundary that distorts municipal planning incentives toward federally-funded schemes rather than cost-effective solutions responsive to residents' needs.

The By-law imposes usage restrictions on CN's Victoria Jubilee Bridge, including vehicle type (max two axles, six tires), weight (13.5 tons gross), height (12 ft), width (8 ft), speed (30 mph), lane restrictions during rush hours, towing fees, and closure authority. Violations incur fines up to $40.

Command-and-control limits prevent market-based pricing, causing deadweight loss, higher transport costs, and misallocation of bridge capacity. They infringe on private property rights, stifle innovation, and impose regulations that are unnecessary if owners could set efficient, risk-based terms. Keeping it harms prosperity and competitiveness.

Mandates pre-arrival radio notification to designated quarantine stations by vessels and aircraft arriving from outside Canada when specific health concerns exist (death, fever, illness, or visits to countries with smallpox/plague), including details about passengers, crew, health status, and travel history, to enable disease monitoring and intervention.

Deletion would remove early warning of deadly infectious diseases that could cause catastrophic loss of life and economic disruption. Voluntary reporting would be unreliable due to incentives to avoid delays; mandatory notification achieves protection at minimal burden.

These regulations govern public works under federal control, prohibiting loitering, unauthorized entry, posting of materials, camping/sleeping, and modification of signs. They establish enforcement mechanisms including fines up to $400 and removal by peace officers.

These regulations create unnecessary restrictions on public spaces that could be handled by existing trespass laws. The $400 fines for minor infractions like loitering or posting materials represent excessive government intervention in public access. Most provisions duplicate common law protections already available, while adding bureaucratic overhead and potential for selective enforcement against peaceful assembly or expression.

Regulation provides a special election mechanism for federal public servants who received erroneous advice about pensionable service under the Public Service Superannuation Act, allowing retroactive counting of certain service periods for pension purposes.

Keeping this regulation sustains a complex administrative apparatus for a privileged public pension system, entrenching distortions in public compensation and intergenerational wealth transfers at taxpayer expense. Its unseen cost is reinforcing the norm that government employment carries special guarantees beyond private sector norms, undermining equal treatment. The same objectives could be achieved through simpler legislative remedy or by transitioning all workers to private pension solutions.

This regulation governs the counting of pensionable service by former members of the Canadian Parliament (Senate or House of Commons) who wish to transfer their retirement benefits to the federal public service pension system. It establishes procedures for medical examinations, payment calculations, and the transfer of contributions between pension accounts.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it provides a fair mechanism for former parliamentarians to consolidate their pension benefits when transitioning to federal public service employment. Without this regulation, these individuals would lose the retirement contributions they made as elected officials, creating an unfair double penalty - they would lose both their parliamentary retirement benefits and the ability to count that service toward their public service pension.

These 1975 regulations transferred pension obligations from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's former private plan (with Sun Life) into the federal Public Service Superannuation Act system. They define eligibility based on employment dates around May 1975, require AECL to make lump-sum payments into the Consolidated Revenue Fund to cover liabilities, and include an appointment form redirecting annuity payments to the government.

Obsolete: its beneficiaries are almost certainly deceased or integrated into other arrangements. Keeping this archaic, narrow statute creates unnecessary legal complexity, consumes administrative resources, and risks unintended consequences. Repeal would reduce regulatory clutter with no negative welfare effects.

This 1973 regulation transfers the Halifax and Saint John pilots' pension funds into the federal Public Service Superannuation system, converting local pilotage pension arrangements for maritime pilots into federal public service pension credits. It establishes mechanisms for: (1) transferring fund assets to the Superannuation Account, (2) continuing pension benefits for pre-1973 retirees under original terms, and (3) converting pilot service credits to pensionable service under the federal Act based on accumulated contributions.

This regulation is obsolete. It facilitated a one-time administrative transition completed over 50 years ago. The employees it covers contributed in 1966-1973 and would almost all be deceased or long-retired. Maintaining this archaic, narrowly-tailored regulation adds unnecessary complexity to the statute books with zero current policy justification. It represents the type of historical regulatory clutter that creates compliance burden for no benefit.

This Direction prohibits the Treasury Board from negotiating collective agreements for specific positions in the Department of External Affairs (positions numbered as listed) on safety or security grounds.

Deleting it would expose Canada to security risks by binding critical positions to collective bargaining constraints that could delay urgent actions. The regulation provides a clean exemption that is administratively simple and avoids complex bargaining exceptions.

These regulations govern the suspension and payment of pension increases for re-employed pension recipients in the federal public service, ensuring coordination between pension increases and existing pension plan rules.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it prevents double-dipping and ensures pension system integrity by coordinating pension increases with existing pension plan rules, preventing unfair advantage and maintaining sustainable public pension funding.

Alberta Turkey Marketing Levies Order establishes mandatory levies on turkey producers who exceed their marketing quotas, with rates varying by turkey type ($0.50-$1.27 per excess bird), enforced through mandatory collection by buyers or direct payment to the Alberta Turkey Growers' Marketing Board.

This regulation creates supply restrictions and price controls that artificially limit turkey production, increase consumer prices, and benefit cartelized producers at the expense of consumers and potential new market entrants. The quota system prevents efficient producers from meeting market demand and creates deadweight loss in the agricultural sector.