Browse regulations

Procedural rules for informal appeals to the Tax Court of Canada under the Excise Act, 2001. Covers filing methods (including electronic), service, replies, expert witnesses, discontinuance, costs with fixed schedules, and contempt. Creates a simplified, lower-cost alternative to general procedure for excise tax disputes.

Deletion would eliminate an accessible, low-cost mechanism for Canadians to challenge excise tax assessments, forcing them into more expensive, complex procedures or leaving them without effective judicial review. The informal procedure protects liberty and property by ensuring due process remains affordable, preventing the government from imposing erroneous assessments without practical recourse.

The Western Grain Transition Payments Regulations implement a compensation program for grain farmers in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and parts of British Columbia. The program provides transition payments based on farmland acreage (dryland/irrigated), productivity factors, and distance-to-port factors, with complex formulas determining interim and final payments. It includes eligibility criteria, application deadlines (1995-1997), and dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes between landowners and lessees regarding payment sharing.

This is a government redistribution program that distorts agricultural markets, misallocates capital based on political criteria rather than economic efficiency, and creates perverse incentives for land use decisions. The regulation serves no legitimate government function—it merely transfers wealth through bureaucratic formulas. Such interventions prevent market price signals from coordinating production, harm competitiveness by propping up uneconomic operations, and impose hidden costs through taxation and administrative overhead. The program's original justification (if any) is long obsolete given the 1995-1997 timeline, and whatever transition it addressed should have been handled through private contracts and market adjustments, not taxpayer bailouts.

Regulation controls tetrachloroethylene (toxic solvent) in dry cleaning: prohibits spotting agents containing it, mandates specific equipment (refrigerated condensers, separators, containment systems), requires waste transport/treatment, bans self-service units, and imposes extensive reporting/record-keeping on importers, sellers, recyclers, and operators.

Command-and-control approach imposes excessive compliance costs, stifles innovation by mandating specific technologies, raises consumer prices, and creates barriers to entry. Same environmental protection achievable more efficiently through liability or performance standards, allowing market participants to find least-cost solutions. Unintended consequences include reduced competition, business closures, and higher costs that harm small operators and consumers.

This regulation establishes that the Sandy Bay Band council (chief and councillors) must be selected through elections held under the Indian Act, effective February 26, 2003.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it ensures democratic selection of Indigenous leadership through established legal frameworks, preventing arbitrary appointment and maintaining accountability to band members.

The regulation imposes levies on egg producers for interprovincial and export sales, with province-specific rates, and establishes a collection mechanism via provincial commodity boards as part of Canada's supply management system for eggs.

These levies and the underlying supply management restrict interprovincial trade, inflate consumer prices, limit production, and create barriers to entry, harming Canadian consumers and would-be producers with no offsetting benefit to overall prosperity.

This order grants remission of customs duties on goods that lost eligibility for the Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff after January 1, 2003. It covers imports from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2005, refunding the difference between the MFN or General Preferential Tariff rates and the Canada-Israel rate as it existed on January 1, 2003. Claims must be submitted within four years of import.

Obsolete and spent (expired 2005). Such temporary remission orders create unnecessary administrative complexity and compliance costs without achieving lasting trade liberalization. Tariff rates should be set directly, not through cumbersome remission schemes that distort incentives and clutter the regulatory framework.

Remission order providing temporary duty relief for goods that would have qualified for Chile Tariff rates but became ineligible after 2003, covering imports from Jan 2003 to Dec 2004 with claims due within 4 years.

Temporary transitional measure that expired over 15 years ago, creating unnecessary regulatory complexity and compliance burden for businesses without providing current economic benefit.

This regulation defines terms and establishes rules for financial companies' investments in technology-related entities, setting limits on investment size (5% of regulatory capital) and restricting activities that could conflict with core banking functions or involve prohibited financial activities.

These restrictions artificially limit financial innovation and competition by preventing companies from fully investing in or acquiring technology firms that could modernize financial services. The 5% cap and activity restrictions protect incumbent banks from disruption rather than protecting consumers, ultimately raising costs and slowing technological advancement in the financial sector.

Prescribes allowable information technology/information services investments for property & casualty and marine insurers, with 5% regulatory capital limit and extensive activity restrictions to ensure focus on core insurance business.

Paternalistic restrictions limit capital deployment into innovative sectors, increase compliance costs passed to policyholders, reduce competitiveness versus foreign insurers, and create unintended barriers to efficient investment. Existing solvency frameworks sufficiently protect policyholders without constraining investment choices.

This regulation governs life insurance companies' investments in information technology and data service entities. It prescribes permissible activities (data systems, information platforms related to financial services), imposes a 5% regulatory capital limit on such investments, restricts certain business activities (deposit-taking, securities dealing), and contains various application rules and exemptions.

The regulation micromanages corporate investment decisions, distorting capital allocation and stifling innovation. Insurance companies should deploy capital based on market signals and profitability—not regulatory prescription. The arbitrary 5% limit and activity restrictions prevent beneficial diversification, create compliance burdens, and reduce Canadian insurers' competitiveness versus US firms with fewer barriers. Prudential oversight should focus on solvency, not dictating business models. The unseen costs include lost innovation synergies, reduced economies of scope, and accelerated brain drain of talent to less restrictive jurisdictions.

Regulation governing insurance holding companies' investments in entities engaged in data transmission, information services, and related activities, including limits on investment size (5% of regulatory capital), restrictions on certain business activities, and exemptions from other regulatory provisions.

Creates artificial barriers to innovation and diversification in financial services, limiting insurance companies' ability to invest in emerging technology sectors and potentially reducing competition and efficiency in both industries.

This regulation defines terms and establishes limits on foreign banks' investments in Canadian entities engaged in data transmission, information services, or communication platforms. It sets a $1 billion or 5% of regulatory capital cap on investments, prohibits certain restricted activities, and creates complex ownership tracking requirements.

This regulation creates artificial barriers to foreign investment in digital services and information technology sectors, limiting capital flow and innovation. The complex ownership tracking requirements impose compliance costs that disproportionately affect smaller entities. The activity restrictions prevent market-driven solutions and maintain Canadian protectionism in sectors where global competition would benefit consumers through better services and lower prices.

Regulation limits credit associations' investments in data/IT systems related to financial services to 5% of regulatory capital, with restrictions on control and prohibited activities.

Creates unnecessary capital constraints that hinder fintech innovation, reduce competition, and harm consumers by limiting service options and increasing costs. Compliance burden distorts capital allocation and prevents efficient market responses.

This regulation governs insurance societies' investments in data-related entities, limiting their total exposure to 5% of regulatory capital and prohibiting investments in entities that accept deposits, engage in financial intermediation, or perform restricted activities like securities dealing or specialized financing.

This regulation restricts capital allocation and innovation by insurance societies, preventing them from investing in emerging data and technology sectors. The 5% cap and prohibited activities list create artificial barriers that reduce competition, limit service diversification, and prevent societies from adapting to digital economy opportunities. The unseen costs include reduced technological advancement in insurance services, higher consumer prices, and Canada falling behind in fintech innovation.

Regulates bank holding companies' investments in data transmission and information services entities, limiting investments to 5% of regulatory capital and restricting activities that overlap with banking prohibitions.

Creates artificial barriers to innovation in financial technology by restricting bank investments in data services and information platforms, limiting competition and consumer choice while protecting incumbent banking interests from market disruption.