Browse regulations

Regulates reporting requirements for cross-border movements of currency and monetary instruments over $10,000 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, requiring detailed documentation and declarations for imports/exports by various transport methods including air, sea, and land.

Creates significant compliance costs and privacy intrusions for ordinary citizens while imposing bureaucratic burdens on legitimate business. The $10,000 threshold catches many harmless transactions, and the extensive reporting requirements disproportionately affect law-abiding Canadians without meaningfully preventing determined criminals who use sophisticated money laundering methods.

This regulation grants extensive diplomatic privileges and immunities to UNESCO, its representatives, officials, and experts in Canada, including tax exemptions, legal immunity, inviolability of premises and communications, and freedom from immigration restrictions. It establishes special status for the UNESCO Institute for Statistics in Montreal and defines various categories of protected individuals and entities under international conventions.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it enables Canada to host international organizations like UNESCO, which contribute to cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation. Removing these immunities would likely cause UNESCO to relocate its Montreal operations elsewhere, resulting in job losses, reduced international collaboration, and diminished Canada's global influence in educational and cultural affairs. The regulation ensures these organizations can operate independently without undue interference, which is essential for their international mandate.

Implements tariff rate quotas under the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement for specific sugar products (HS codes 1701 and 1702), setting aggregate quantity limits for preferential tariff treatment during specified periods.

Deletion would breach Canada's treaty obligations, risking trade disputes, retaliation, and loss of preferential market access for Canadian exporters to Costa Rica. The regulation implements negotiated market access commitments in a transparent, rule-based manner that provides certainty for traders and ensures compliance with international law, which would be difficult to achieve through ad-hoc measures.

A customs duty remission program for producers of 'original designer apparel' that refunds import tariffs on qualifying fabrics. The program defines elaborate criteria including what constitutes 'innovative apparel,' 'recognized apparel designer,' and sets conditions like minimum fabric value ($14/sq m indexed), usage restrictions, semi-annual reporting, and audit requirements. The remission period ended December 31, 2014.

This regulation is expired (ended 2014) and represents the type of special-interest industrial subsidy that distorts market signals, creates administrative burdens, and violates equal protection by favoring fashion designers over other manufacturers. Even when active, it was protectionist corporate welfare that misallocated resources by artificially lowering costs for a politically-connected industry while other sectors faced full tariffs. The complex eligibility criteria and reporting requirements imposed compliance costs on both businesses and CBSA for a program that should never have existed—trade policy should lower barriers universally, not selectively refund them for chosen winners.

The regulation facilitates customs duty remissions for specific textile goods imported from Costa Rica under the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, limiting annual quotas and requiring certifications. It aims to promote trade alignment and reduce import costs for qualifying products.

Deleting this regulation would likely increase tariffs on Canadian imports of Costa Rican textiles, raising costs for businesses and consumers. This could harm competitiveness, reduce supply, and undermine the benefits of a long-standing free trade agreement that supports cross-border commerce. The administrative conditions ensure cautious use of the tariffs while still enabling economic benefits.

Establishes rules for determining when goods qualify for Costa Rica Tariff treatment, requiring proof of origin through shipping documentation and customs control records, particularly for goods shipped through third countries.

This regulation ensures the integrity of preferential trade agreements by preventing circumvention through false origin claims. Without these documentation requirements, Canadian businesses would face unfair competition from goods that don't actually originate in Costa Rica, undermining the benefits of the free trade agreement for legitimate Canadian importers and consumers.

Establishes preferential tariff treatment for casual goods acquired in Costa Rica, deeming them to originate in Costa Rica if properly marked or unmarked without contrary evidence, as part of the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement.

This regulation facilitates duty-free trade of personal goods between Canada and Costa Rica, reducing costs for travelers and tourists. Deleting it would create unnecessary friction and costs for casual cross-border commerce that serves no protective purpose.

Regulation sets detailed rules of origin for goods under the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, defining when a product qualifies as 'originating' and thus eligible for preferential tariffs. It includes criteria such as tariff classification changes, regional value-content requirements (35% or 25%), accumulation rules, and specific valuation and documentation standards.

Canadians would be worse off if deleted because the regulation is essential for implementing the FTA's preferential tariff regime, which reduces trade costs and increases market access. The detailed rules—tariff shifts, value thresholds, and documentation—are necessary to prevent transshipment and ensure benefits accrue to genuine producers in member countries, a mechanism that would be difficult to replicate simply. The net economic gains from expanded trade outweigh the compliance burden.

These regulations were repealed in 2012 and are no longer in effect. They appear to be administrative provisions that were removed as part of a regulatory cleanup or consolidation.

Regulations have already been repealed and are obsolete. No current regulatory burden exists, though their original existence likely created unnecessary administrative complexity before repeal.

Fees for environmental assessment of new substances under CEPA, tiered by company sales with caps and provisions for matched/consolidated notifications

Prevents uncompensated harm from toxic substances; user-pay fees scaled to firm size; includes efficiency measures; removal risks externalities exceeding assessment costs

Regulations governing disability allowances for members of Parliament, establishing procedures for eligibility determination, medical certification, application process, and payment mechanisms.

Canadians would be worse off: without it, disabled legislators face financial ruin or ineffective service, deterring capable people from office. The regulation achieves its goal efficiently through a tiered verification process (medical, Clerk, Minister, Governor in Council) that prevents abuse while ensuring security—a balance that ad hoc arrangements would struggle to replicate.

These regulations were repealed in 2015 by SOR/2015-203, section 15. The content is no longer in force and has been officially removed from the regulatory framework.

Regulations are already repealed and obsolete. No longer in effect, creating unnecessary regulatory burden through outdated provisions that could confuse compliance efforts.

Sets federal and provincial chicken marketing quotas, quota allocation rules, and licensing requirements administered by Commodity Boards and the Canadian Chicken Licensing Regulations, governing interprovincial and export trade of chicken.

Quotas artificially limit chicken supply, driving up consumer prices and restricting competition; removing them would increase availability and lower costs without compromising quality, aligning with market‑driven prosperity.

Regulates licensing, import/export, production, and distribution of Class A and B drug precursors (chemicals used in illegal drug manufacturing). Requires permits, security measures, record-keeping, and personnel background checks. Provides exemptions for certain low-risk products, retail sales under quantity thresholds, personal medical use, and specific industrial applications.

Prevents diversion of precursor chemicals to illegal drug production, which imposes substantial externalities (addiction, crime, healthcare costs). The regulation is risk-based (Class A/B distinction, quantity thresholds), includes exemptions for legitimate low-risk uses, and meets international treaty obligations. While imposing compliance costs, no viable alternative exists to prevent this specific harm effectively; unregulated precursor access would significantly worsen public safety and increase social costs from illegal drug manufacturing.

This regulation establishes levies and quotas for chicken marketing in Canada, including federal quotas, market development quotas, specialty chicken quotas, and administrative fees collected by processors and producers. It covers audit periods, provincial variations, exemptions for small producers, and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This quota system creates artificial supply restrictions and price controls that benefit incumbent producers at consumer expense. It raises chicken prices, reduces market competition, limits innovation in production methods, and creates regulatory complexity that disproportionately harms small producers and new market entrants. The system's administrative costs and compliance burdens outweigh any claimed benefits of market stability.