Browse regulations

Procedural regulations for the Canada Industrial Relations Board governing filing, service, evidence, hearings, and interim orders in labour disputes under the Canada Labour Code.

This regulation entrenches a coercive state monopoly on labour dispute resolution that violates freedom of contract. Private arbitration and courts can resolve these disputes more efficiently without government-mandated procedures, reducing costs and delays. The unseen costs include distorted bargaining incentives, increased transaction costs, and suppression of market-driven alternatives that would adapt to parties' specific needs.

This regulation establishes airport zoning restrictions around Goose Bay Airport to protect navigable airspace by controlling building heights, natural growth, and land use near the airport.

Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it prevents catastrophic mid-air collisions by ensuring clear approach paths for aircraft, which is essential for aviation safety in a region where air travel is critical for transportation and emergency services.

Regulation prescribes definitions under the Canada Business Corporations Act, including 'distributing corporation' and 'going-private transaction'; sets extensive rules for corporate names (prohibiting confusing, descriptive, or misdescriptive names, and names connoting government or professional endorsement); prescribes electronic communication and notice requirements; mandates tracking of individuals with significant control; and specifies procedures for shareholder proposals and meetings.

Keeping this regulation imposes substantial compliance burdens, restricts naming freedom through vague and subjective standards, duplicates existing legal protections, grants excessive bureaucratic discretion, and creates uncertainty that deters entrepreneurship. The regulation's hidden costs—delays, legal fees, and stifled innovation—outweigh any marginal benefits in consumer protection or corporate clarity.

Designates specific geographic areas as 'special duty areas' under the Pension Act for designated time periods, creating differential treatment for pension purposes based on location.

Creates unequal treatment and regulatory complexity by granting geographic-based special status, which distorts labor mobility, imposes arbitrary distinctions, and fragments the pension system. Special area designations invite rent-seeking, create administrative burdens, and could be addressed through universal rules or individual circumstances rather than regional categorization.

Regulation establishes a framework for First Nations to tax railway and utility property on specific reserves, requiring use of provincial assessment methods, capping tax rates at provincial equivalents, and mandating review by the First Nations Tax Commission.

Caps on tax rates and mandatory provincial assessment methods restrict First Nations' fiscal sovereignty and revenue potential from their own lands. The framework adds bureaucratic costs, reduces flexibility for market negotiations, and represents federal overreach into local taxation, undermining property rights and economic self-determination.

Prescribes supervisory information that insurance holding companies and their affiliates must keep confidential, including financial ratings, intervention stages, regulatory orders, and examination reports, with limited exceptions for affiliates, internal parties, and securities disclosure requirements.

Without this regulation, insurance holding companies could disclose sensitive supervisory information that could undermine financial stability, enable market manipulation, or harm the institution's competitive position before regulatory issues are resolved.

Prescribes specific information generated by bank supervision (ratings, intervention stages, orders, examination reports) as confidential, prohibiting bank holding companies from disclosing it externally with narrow exceptions for internal sharing (with confidentiality) and securities law compliance.

Premature disclosure of supervisory information could trigger market panic, bank runs, or competitive harm that destabilizes the financial system. The regulation is narrowly tailored to protect only information generated through the supervisory process, with appropriate exceptions for legitimate needs. Canadians would be worse off without it due to increased systemic risk and loss of confidence in financial institutions.

This regulation imposes restrictions on insurance holding companies' ownership of specialized financing entities (SFEs) - entities that hold shares of other companies insurance companies could invest in. It sets debt-to-equity limits (2:1 ratio), bans SFEs from certain activities (vehicle leasing, insurance brokerage), caps aggregate investments at $250M, limits exposures to 10% and 25% of the insurance holding company's regulatory capital, and imposes a 13-year maximum holding period on investments through SFEs. It also exempts such investments from certain approval requirements in the Insurance Companies Act.

This regulation micromanages corporate structures with arbitrary numeric caps and time limits that distort efficient capital allocation, increase compliance costs, and reduce flexibility. The 13-year holding limit is particularly capricious. The same policy objectives of protecting policyholders and preventing excessive risk-taking could be achieved through simpler, principles-based oversight that allows market discipline and private risk management rather than rigid quantitative restrictions.

Regulation imposes ownership restrictions on bank holding companies' investments in specialized financing entities, including debt-to-equity caps, investment type prohibitions, $250M aggregate limit, 10% and 25% regulatory capital limits, and a 13-year holding period limit. It also exempts such investments from certain approval requirements under the Bank Act.

The regulation distorts market allocation of capital through arbitrary constraints: the 13-year forced sale timeline disrupts long-term investment planning; sectoral prohibitions (e.g., insurance brokerage, motor vehicle leasing) protect incumbents and prevent efficient financing activities; and capital thresholds override voluntary risk assessment. These interventions create deadweight losses, reduce financial innovation, and substitute bureaucratic judgment for market discipline, harming savers, borrowers, and economic growth.

Regulation setting membership requirements for the Canadian Payments Association, requiring either insured/guaranteed deposits for most members, or membership in specific investment dealer associations for others.

Creates artificial barriers to entry in the payments system, protecting incumbents and stifling competition. The requirement to join specific industry associations constitutes regulatory capture that limits consumer choice, raises costs, and impedes financial innovation without directly improving payment safety or stability.

Regulation prescribes investment restrictions for money market mutual funds to ensure liquidity and safety, mandating holdings be limited to cash, cash equivalents, and short-term high-quality debt instruments with approved credit ratings, average maturity ≤90 days, and currency matching.

Unnecessary constraint on private capital deployment; raises barriers to entry via compliance costs; enshrines protected rating agencies; suppresses innovation in fund structures; and relies on flawed rating models—market discipline through transparent disclosure is superior and would allow investors to choose risk profiles suited to their needs.

This regulation establishes the assessment formula by which the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) collects fees from various financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, trust companies, etc.) to fund its operations. Assessments are based primarily on each institution's share of total assets or net premiums/revenue within its category, with a $1,000 minimum. The Commissioner calculates and notifies each institution annually.

This assessment mechanism creates a user-pays regulatory funding model that distorts incentives, increases costs passed to consumers, and creates barriers to entry for smaller institutions. The complex formulas add administrative burden without democratic accountability that general taxation provides. FCAC's consumer protection mandate should be funded through transparent parliamentary appropriations, not through extractive fees on the regulated entities that may compromise regulatory independence and create perceptions of regulatory capture.

Regulation mandates oral disclosure of deposit account fees, interest terms, and cancellation rights when accounts are opened by telephone under the Trust and Loan Companies Act. Full written disclosure must follow within 7 business days, and customers have a 14-day no-cost cancellation window.

Canadians would be worse off without it: This regulation corrects asymmetric information in telephone banking where customers cannot review written terms before agreeing. Oral disclosure ensures real-time comprehension of key costs and rights, preventing hidden fees and uninformed consent. Private alternatives would be less reliable and could create fragmented, costly compliance across institutions, harming consumer welfare.

The regulation consisted of 10 sections, all repealed by SOR/2009-326, s. 15. Original content not provided; purpose, scope, and mechanisms cannot be determined.

Obsolete: Already repealed and not in force. Original flaws unknown due to missing text, but the fact of repeal suggests it was unnecessary or harmful. Keeping repealed regulations creates confusion, wastes administrative resources, and undermines legal clarity.

Defines 'total assets' for insurance companies under the Insurance Companies Act, referencing Superintendent's accounting principles. Contains a repeal clause and came into force in 2001; appears obsolete.

Even definitional regulations impose compliance costs, reduce flexibility, and add to regulatory complexity. The Superintendent's accounting standards could be issued as guidance, avoiding legal penalties and allowing market innovation. This regulation's repeal confirms its superfluity and the unnecessary burden it created.