Browse regulations

Defines 'total assets' for regulatory capital requirements under the Bank Act, establishing a specific accounting-based measurement standard for bank and bank holding company capital calculations.

This technical definition provides essential consistency for financial regulation and capital adequacy assessment. Without it, banks could use varying asset valuation methods, creating systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage opportunities that would ultimately harm Canadian financial stability and consumers.

Defines 'total assets' for trust and loan companies as the balance sheet total following the Superintendent's accounting principles, applicable to subsection 380(3) of the Trust and Loan Companies Act. Includes coming-into-force provision tied to the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act.

This definition adds unnecessary regulatory complexity and delegates broad authority to the Superintendent, enabling future regulatory creep. It contributes to a burdensome compliance regime that increases costs for financial institutions, stifles innovation, and reduces competitiveness. The regulation is superfluous; the Superintendent's specifications would still apply by reference from the primary Act, and any ambiguity could be resolved through judicial interpretation. Keeping it entrenches micromanagement that distorts incentives and raises barriers to entry.

Regulation permits insurance holding company subsidiaries that are regulated securities entities to hold shares of the parent company up to 1% of regulatory capital, with an exception for securities underwriters during distributions.

Imposes arbitrary limits on voluntary share holdings, reducing financial flexibility and efficiency without clear benefit, while creating regulatory burden and distorting capital allocation incentives.

Limits a bank holding company's securities-subsidiary shareholding to 1% of regulatory capital, with a temporary exception for underwriters during a distribution, implementing ownership restrictions under the Bank Act.

Deletion could let banks use securities affiliates to circumvent ownership limits, undermining regulatory capital integrity and financial stability that protects depositors and the broader economy; the rule provides a clear, enforceable standard that would be hard to replicate due to complex ownership structures.

This regulation restricts foreign banks and their associated entities from engaging in specialized financing activities in Canada. It imposes investment caps ($250 million), 13-year holding limits, ownership restrictions, and prohibitions on acquiring control of certain types of entities (like motor vehicle leasing companies, property rental businesses, and insurance brokers/agents). The rules apply to specialized financing entities that can only invest in entities banks are permitted to invest in under the Bank Act.

This regulation creates artificial barriers to foreign capital and expertise in Canada's financial sector, reducing competition, innovation, and investment. The $250 million caps and 13-year limits are arbitrary constraints that distort efficient capital allocation and deter foreign financial institutions from establishing significant operations in Canada. By restricting ownership of specialized financing entities and prohibiting investments in certain viable business models (motor vehicle leasing, property rental, insurance), the regulation reduces consumer choice, increases costs, and makes Canada less competitive globally. These protectionist measures prioritize restricting foreign participation over maximizing prosperity through open markets, contrary to the principles of liberty and private property that create wealth.

These regulations govern specialized financing activities by trust and loan companies, establishing limits on investments in various entities including caps on balance sheet values, regulatory capital percentages, and time restrictions (13-year maximum). The rules create complex restrictions on what companies can invest in, with specific prohibitions on entities engaged in vehicle leasing, temporary possession of property, and insurance brokerage.

These regulations create artificial constraints on capital allocation that reduce market efficiency and innovation. The complex ownership restrictions and capital limits prevent companies from deploying capital where it would be most productive, increase compliance costs, and create unintended consequences by forcing companies to structure investments inefficiently to comply with arbitrary thresholds.

Regulation restricts retail associations' specialized financing activities by prohibiting investments in certain entities (e.g., insurance brokers, motor vehicle leasing for credit), imposing investment caps ($250M balance sheet limit, 10% or 25% of regulatory capital), and limiting holding periods to 13 years, with additional debt-based ownership restrictions.

Imposes arbitrary constraints that reduce competition, increase financing costs for consumers, and distort capital allocation; compliance burdens divert resources from productive use, while limits on scale and scope stifle innovation and efficiency in credit markets, ultimately harming economic liberty and growth.

The regulation restricts life insurers' investments in specialized financing entities through per-entity caps ($250M), regulatory capital limits (10%/25%), a 13-year maximum holding period, prohibitions on certain businesses (motor vehicle leasing, insurance brokerage), and ownership restrictions, while exempting these activities from certain approvals.

These arbitrary constraints distort capital allocation, reduce policyholder returns, impose compliance costs, and hinder Canadian insurers' competitiveness. The 13-year forced divestiture disrupts long-term investments, and the prescriptive limits cannot account for individual risk profiles, creating inefficiencies and supply barriers that harm prosperity and liberty.

This regulation defines and restricts banks' 'specialized financing activities' through subsidiaries or specialized financing entities. It prohibits investments in certain entities (insurance brokers, vehicle leasing/rental for credit), imposes investment caps ($250M), time limits (13 years), and capital allocation limits (10% and 25% of regulatory capital). It also imposes ownership restrictions on the structure and leverage of these entities.

This regulation micromanages bank activities, stifling financial innovation and competition. Artificial limits prevent banks from efficiently allocating capital to meet market demand, reducing access to financing options and raising costs for Canadians. Prudential goals could be achieved through market discipline and transparent disclosure rather than prescriptive restrictions. If banks fail, shareholders and uninsured depositors should bear losses — not taxpayers — eliminating the need for such activity constraints.

This regulation imposes ownership restrictions on cooperative credit associations regarding their investments in specialized financing entities. It includes debt-to-equity ratios (2:1), prohibitions on certain activities (vehicle leasing, temporary property possession, insurance brokering), aggregate investment caps ($250M, 10% and 25% of regulatory capital), and a 13-year holding limit. It also provides exceptions and specifies that certain approvals are not required.

These restrictions artificially limit the ability of member-owned credit associations to diversify, innovate, and respond to market opportunities. The arbitrary caps and activity prohibitions reduce competition in financial services, raise costs for consumers, and prevent efficient capital allocation. Market discipline and existing capital requirements, not prescriptive investment mandates, should govern these institutions' risk-taking. The 13-year limit forces unnecessary asset sales and undermines long-term planning. Compliance costs divert resources from serving members.

Sets a maximum fee of $5 for security certificates issued in respect of transfers under the Bank Act and Insurance Companies Act. This price ceiling limits what financial institutions can charge for this service.

Price ceilings create shortages and reduce quality. This $5 limit (from 2001, worth ~$7.30 today) is an artificial constraint that prevents financial institutions from charging market rates. If certificates cost more than $5 to produce, they may be discontinued, bundled into higher fees elsewhere, or quality reduced. The regulation assumes market prices would be exploitative without evidence, ignoring that competition among banks and insurers already disciplines pricing. This distortion reduces supply and harms consumers through hidden costs rather than transparent pricing.

This regulation defines 'regulatory capital' for insurance holding companies under the Insurance Companies Act. It calculates regulatory capital as total shareholders' equity, minority interests, and subordinated indebtedness minus goodwill. Only securities that are subordinated to liabilities, fully paid, and have a minimum five-year term (with no redemption in the first five years) qualify for inclusion.

Deletion would risk inflating capital counts with low-quality instruments, raising insolvency probability and endangering policyholders. The regulation's strict eligibility criteria ensure capital is genuinely loss-absorbing; such discipline is not achievable through market forces alone due to information asymmetry and policyholders' limited monitoring capacity.

Defines regulatory capital for bank holding companies and related entities, specifying required components and inclusion restrictions for securities and investments.

Imposes needless compliance burdens and capital constraints that hinder private property rights and market freedom, creating obstacles to prosperity without clear benefit.

Sections 1-4 of this regulation were repealed by SOR/2006-320, section 6 and are no longer in force.

The regulation is obsolete and already repealed. Maintaining repealed laws creates legal uncertainty and unnecessary administrative burden without any benefit.

The regulation consists of sections 1 to 4, all of which have been repealed by SOR/2006-318, section 6. The original purpose and content are no longer in force.

The regulation is already repealed and therefore irrelevant; it has no current legal effect and imposes no costs or benefits.