This appears to be a regulation that was repealed in 2006, containing only repealed sections with no active provisions.
Already repealed in 2006, making it obsolete and unnecessary to maintain in current regulatory framework.
Regulations 1-4 have been repealed as of SOR/2006-318, s. 5. These regulations are no longer in force and have no current legal effect.
Regulations have already been repealed and are obsolete. No current regulatory burden exists to evaluate.
Extends Bank Act restrictions to foreign banks and associated entities, prohibiting or limiting their involvement in making or acquiring loans secured by Canadian real property.
Restricting foreign bank participation reduces competition in mortgage lending, increasing borrowing costs and constraining capital supply for Canadian homebuyers; protectionist barriers distort the financial market and worsen housing affordability by limiting credit options.
Requires written permission from a company or insurance holding company to use its name in securities-related documents (prospectus, offering memorandum, takeover bid circular, advertisements) unless required by law. Protects corporate identity in capital markets.
Canadians would be worse off without this: unauthorized use of company names in securities documents could mislead investors, facilitate fraud, and harm brand integrity. The regulation achieves its goal through a simple permission framework that aligns with property rights and would be difficult to replace with equally clear, low-cost alternatives.
Restricts the use of bank or bank holding company names in securities-related documents unless required by law or with written permission.
Redundant with existing defamation, fraud, and trademark laws; creates unnecessary compliance burden and transaction delays without providing unique protection. Banks already have strong reputational incentives to police misuse, and existing legal remedies suffice for harmful or deceptive use.
Defines entities subject to regulatory restrictions under Bank Act subsection 983(5.1), including banks, foreign banks, their affiliates, and entities with substantial investments, thereby setting boundaries for banking relationship regulations.
Keeping this regulation perpetuates a framework that restricts voluntary capital allocation, imposes unnecessary compliance costs, and interferes with market discipline. It contributes to the regulatory chill that drives financial talent abroad and reduces Canada's competitiveness. The unseen cost is the erosion of property rights and the stifling of financial innovation that could improve efficiency and access to capital.
This regulation consists of sections 1-8, all marked as 'Repealed, SOR/2008-156, s. 5'. It contains no active provisions and has been officially repealed.
The regulation is already repealed and of no legal effect; keeping it on the books creates confusion and unnecessary complexity in the regulatory framework.
Limits trust and loan companies' total exposure (investments, loans, guarantees) to designated entities where they lack control to 50% of regulatory capital, aiming to constrain concentration risk and safeguard solvency.
The rigid cap suppresses legitimate credit intermediation and capital allocation, reducing the supply of financing to businesses and consumers. Market discipline and internal risk governance can achieve prudent exposure management without such heavy-handed, arbitrary constraints that hinder economic dynamism.
This regulation imposes a 50% limit on the total value of shares, loans, and guarantees that an insurance holding company may hold in non-controlled designated entities (financial intermediaries) relative to its regulatory capital, aiming to prevent concentration risk and protect policyholders.
Deletion could enable excessive concentration of insurance capital in risky affiliated entities, jeopardizing policyholder protection and financial stability. The 50% cap provides an objective, enforceable guardrail against self-dealing and correlated losses that market discipline alone would likely fail to prevent due to principal-agent problems.
These regulations limit insurance companies' substantial investments in, and loans to, non-controlled designated entities to 50% of regulatory capital, with some exemptions, to constrain exposure.
The regulation unjustly restricts capital allocation, imposing an arbitrary cap that may reduce investment returns and increase insurance costs. Compliance burdens divert resources, and the cap distorts risk management by preventing sound diversification. Market discipline and internal risk controls are superior to a blunt quantitative limit.
Regulation limits cooperative credit associations' total exposure (shares, loans, guarantees) to designated entities they do not control to 50% of their regulatory capital, restricting substantial investments and lending to manage concentration risk.
The 50% cap replaces dynamic risk assessment with a rigid government mandate, distorting portfolio decisions and preventing potentially beneficial, low-risk investments that could strengthen financial institutions and expand credit availability. It substitutes political judgment for board oversight, creates arbitrary constraints, and the compliance costs are borne by members and communities through reduced returns and limited services.
Regulation limits bank investments in non-controlled 'designated entities' (financial intermediaries like factoring, finance, leasing, specialized financing entities) to 50% of regulatory capital, counting equity, loans, and guarantees collectively. Imposes a broad concentration limit without risk differentiation.
Arbitrary 50% concentration limit on a broad category of investments restricts banks' ability to allocate capital efficiently and diversify risk. Forces divestment from potentially productive financial intermediation based on regulatory class rather than actual risk. Creates regulatory burden without commensurate benefit—risk management is better handled through risk-weighted capital and modern large exposure frameworks that differentiate by counterparty risk. Likely obsolete and redundant with Basel III requirements.
This regulation governs bank holding companies' substantial investments in designated entities, setting limits on total value of shares, loans, and guarantees to 50% of regulatory capital, with specific restrictions on acquisitions and guarantees.
Canadians would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it prevents excessive risk concentration in the banking sector, protecting depositors and the financial system from potential collapses that could trigger economic crises and loss of savings.
A remission order providing targeted surtax relief to specific importers of U.S. motor vehicles during a one-year window (April 2025-April 2026). The relief applies to a confidential list of importers and business numbers, requiring information sharing with Ministers and imposing conditions about Canadian manufacturing restart. It is a selective, discretionary carve-out from broader U.S. surtax measures.
This regulation embodies cronyism and non-transparent government favoritism. It selectively remits tariffs for specific approved importers while keeping others subject to the full burden, distorting trade and investment decisions. The confidential schedule bypasses public scrutiny, creating rent-seeking opportunities and moral hazard. Market participants should bear the consequences of trade policy uniformly; targeted relief manipulates outcomes, increases administrative state power, and violates the principle of equal treatment under law. Any hardships from tariffs should be addressed by market adjustments, not government picking winners.
These regulations define metrics for calculating the proportion of a financial entity's activities/business conducted in Canada versus abroad using asset and revenue-based formulas. They establish technical criteria for regulatory classification tied to the implementation date of specific provisions in the Bank Act.
The regulation creates unnecessary complexity through opaque percentage calculations that risk arbitrary enforcement and compliance costs. As a definitional framework without clear public interest justification, it likely duplicates existing provisions in the Bank Act and introduces regulatory drag inconsistent with principles of economic liberty. Its implementation date dependency suggests it may become obsolete immediately upon enactment of referenced legislation, rendering it redundant.